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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court had original appellate jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78A-"- • 02 The Court of Appeals now has 
jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78A-4-103(2)(j). 
V 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
Mr. Henshaw asserts the following issues on appeal: 
A. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in denying Mr. Henshaw's 
Motion to Vacate that portion of the trial court's May 15, 2006 directed verdict 
holding that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights the Kings admit they 
sold to the Watrouses, that Mrs. Watrous thereafter sold to Barbara Henshaw and 
Barbara Henshaw sold to Dee Henshaw, did not pass to Dee Henshaw, because the 
Kings lacked standing to even assert that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water 
rights, that the Kings admit they sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred 
Watrous upon Raymond Watrous's death and ultimately to Mr. Henshaw? (Record 
at 1393). 
Standard of Review: When a motion to vacate is based on a claim of lack of 
jurisdiction, it is reviewed under the correctness standard. 95 P.3d 1211; State of 
Utah v. All Real Property: 2004 UT App 232. 
B. Did the trial court err in denying Mr. Henshaw's Motion To Vacate 
Under Rule 60(b)(4) URCP as "untimely?" (Record at 1360-1361). 
Standard of Review: A denial of a motion under Rule 60(b) is ordinarily 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
STATUTES: 
I JC V §75-1-201: 
General definitions. 
Si lb ject to additional definitions contained in the subsequent chapters that are 
ap j: \i : i .ble to specific chapters, parts, or sections, andun less the context otherwise 
i • i :][i :i ii • 3S, in this code : 
(1) "Agent'1 includes an attoi ne> -in-fact undei a durable oi nondurable po v\ ei c f 
attorney, an individual authorized to make decisions concerning another's health 
cai e and an,,, indrs ddual authorized to make decisions for another under a natural 
• :ic:: ath act. 
(2) "Application" means a written, request to the registrar for an order of informal 
probate or appointment under Title 75, Chapter 3, Part 3, Informal Probate and 
Appointment Proceedings. 
(3) "Beneficiary," as it relates to trust beneficiaries, includes a person who has 
an^ present or future interest, vested or contingent, and also includes the owner of 
an interest by assignment or other transfer; as it relates to a charitable trust, includes 
any person entitled to enforce the trust; as it relates to a "beneficiary of a beneficiary 
designation," refers to a beneficiary of an insurance or annuity policy, of an account 
ith POD designation, of a security registered in beneficiary form (TOD), or of a 
j : • :! iniisi : n, profit-sharing, retirement, or similar benefit plan, or other nonprobate 
t! ai lsfei at death; and, as it relates to a "beneficiary designated in a governing 
insti i in i ' " nu-iudes a grantee of a deed, a devisee, a trust beneficiary, a, 
1: • ;: ii 2fi :: or' a beneficiary designation, a donee, appointee, or taker m default of a 
pow er ot" appointment, and a, person in whose favor a power of attorney or a power 
held in any individual, fiduciary, or representative capacity is exercised. 
(4) "Beneficiary designation,..1' refers to :i ^ovenurM instalment naming a 
- \ ii 
beneficiary of an insurance or annuity policy, of an account with POD designation, 
of a security registered in beneficiary form (TOD), or of a pension, profit-sharing, 
retirement, or similar benefit plan, or other nonprobate transfer at death. 
(5) "Child" includes any individual entitled to take as a child under this code by 
intestate succession from the parent whose relationship is involved and excludes any 
person who is only a stepchild, a foster child, a grandchild, or any more remote 
descendant. 
(6) "Claims," in respect to estates of decedents and protected persons, includes 
liabilities of the decedent or protected person, whether arising in contract, in tort, or 
otherwise, and liabilities of the estate which arise at or after the death of the 
decedent or after the appointment of a conservator, including funeral expenses and 
expenses of administration. "Claims" does not include estate or inheritance taxes, or 
demands or disputes regarding title of a decedent or protected person to specific 
assets alleged to be included in the estate. 
(7) "Conservator" means a person who is appointed by a court to manage the 
estate of a protected person. 
(8) "Court" means any of the courts of record in this state having jurisdiction in 
matters relating to the affairs of decedents. 
(9) "Descendant" of an individual means all of his descendants of all generations, 
with the relationship of parent and child at each generation being determined by the 
definition of child and parent contained in this title. 
(10) "Devise," when used as a noun, means a testamentary disposition of real or 
personal property and, when used as a verb, means to dispose of real or personal 
property by will. 
(11) "Devisee" means any person designated in a will to receive a devise. For the 
purposes of Title 75, Chapter 3, Probate of Wills and Administration, in the case of 
a devise to an existing trust or trustee, or to a trustee in trust described by will, the 
trust or trustee is the devisee,and the beneficiaries are not devisees. 
(12) "Disability" means cause for a protective order as described by Section 
75-5-401. 
(13) "Distributee" means any person who has received property of a decedent 
from his personal representative other than as a creditor or purchaser. A 
testamentary trustee is a distributee only to the extent of distributed assets or 
increment thereto remaining in his hands. A beneficiary of a testamentary trust to 
whom the trustee has distributed property received from a personal representative is 
a distributee of the personal representative. For purposes of this provision, 
"testamentary trustee" includes a trustee to whom assets are transferred by will, to 
the extent of the devised assets. 
(14) "Estate" includes the property of the decedent, trust, or other person whose 
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affairs are subject to this title as originally constituted and as it exists from time to 
time during administration. 
(15) "Exempt property" means that property of a decedent's estate which is 
described in Section 75-2-403. 
(16) "Fiduciary" includes a personal representative, guardian, conservator, and 
trustee. 
(17) "Foreign personal representative" means a personal representative of 
another jurisdiction. 
(18) "Formal proceedings" means proceedings conducted before a judge with 
notice to interested persons. 
(19) "Governing instrument" means a deed, will, trust, insurance or annuity 
policy, account with POD designation, security registered in beneficiary form 
(TOD), pension, profit-sharing, retirement, or similar benefit plan, instrument 
creating or exercising a power of appointment or a power of attorney, or a 
dispositive, appointive, or nominative instrument of any similar type. 
(20) "Guardian" means a person who has qualified as a guardian of a minor or 
incapacitated person pursuant to testamentary or court appointment, or by written 
instrument as provided in Section 75-5-202.5, but excludes one who is merely a 
guardian ad litem. 
(21) "Heirs," except as controlled by Section 75-2-711, means persons, including 
the surviving spouse and state, who are entitled under the statutes of intestate 
succession to the property of a decedent. 
(22) "Incapacitated person" means any person who is impaired by reason of 
mental illness, mental deficiency, physical illness or disability, chronic use of drugs, 
chronic intoxication, or other cause, except minority, to the extent of lacking 
sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions. 
(23) "Informal proceedings" mean those conducted without notice to interested 
persons by an officer of the court acting as a registrar for probate of a will or 
appointment of a personal representative. 
(24) "Interested person" includes heirs, devisees, children, spouses, creditors, 
beneficiaries, and any others having a property right in or claim against a trust estate 
or the estate of a decedent, ward, or protected person. It also includes persons 
having priority for appointment as personal representative, other fiduciaries 
representing interested persons, a settlor of a trust, if living, or the settlor's legal 
representative, if any, if the settlor is living but incapacitated. The meaning as it 
relates to particular persons may vary from time to time and shall be determined 
according to the particular purposes of, and matter involved in, any proceeding. 
(25) "Issue" of a person means descendant as defined in Subsection (9). 
(26) "Joint tenants with the right of survivorship" and "community property with 
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the right of survivorship" includes coowners of property held under circumstances 
that entitle one or more to the whole of the property on the death of the other or 
others, but excludes forms of coownership registration in which the underlying 
ownership of each party is in proportion to that party's contribution. 
(27) "Lease" includes an oil, gas, or other mineral lease. 
(28) "Letters" includes letters testamentary, letters of guardianship, letters of 
administration, and letters of conservatorship. 
(29) "Minor" means a person who is under 18 years of age. 
(30) "Mortgage" means any conveyance, agreement, or arrangement in which 
property is used as security. 
(31) "Nonresident decedent" means a decedent who was domiciled in another 
jurisdiction at the time of his death. 
(32) "Organization" includes a corporation, limited liability company, business 
trust, estate, trust, partnership, joint venture, association, government of 
governmental subdivision or agency, or any other legal or commercial entity. 
(33) "Parent" includes any person entitled to take, or who would be entitled to 
take if the child died without a will, as a parent under this code by intestate 
succession from the child whose relationship is in question and excludes any person 
who is only a stepparent, foster parent, or grandparent. 
(34) "Payor" means a trustee, insurer, business entity, employer, government, 
governmental agency or subdivision, or any other person authorized or obligated by 
law or a governing instrument to make payments. 
(35) "Person" means an individual or an organization. 
(36) (a) "Personal representative" includes executor, administrator, successor 
personal representative, special administrator, and persons who perform 
substantially the same function under the law governing their status. 
(b) "General personal representative" excludes special administrator. 
(37) "Petition" means a written request to the court for an order after notice. 
(38) "Proceeding" includes action at law and suit in equity. 
(39) "Property" includes both real and personal property or any interest therein 
and means anything that may be the subject of ownership. 
(40) "Protected person" means a person for whom a conservator has been 
appointed. A "minor protected person" means a minor for whom a conservator has 
been appointed because of minority. 
(41) "Protective proceeding" means a proceeding described in Section 75-5-401. 
(42) "Registrar" refers to the official of the court designated to perform the 
functions of registrar as provided in Section 75-1-307. 
(43) "Security" includes any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, 
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest, or participation in an oil, gas, or 
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mining title or lease or in payments out of production under such a title or lease, 
collateral trust certificate, transferable share, voting trust certificate, and, in general, 
any interest or instrument commonly known as a security, or any certificate of 
interest or participation, any temporary or interim certificate, receipt, or certificate 
of deposit for, or any warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the 
foregoing. 
(44) "Settlement," in reference to a decedent's estate, includes the full process of 
administration, distribution, and closing. 
(45) "Special administrator" means a personal representative as described in 
Sections 75-3-614 through 75-3-618. 
(46) "State" means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, any territory or insular possession subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States, or a Native American tribe or band recognized by 
federal law or formally acknowledged by a state. 
(47) "Successor personal representative" means a personal representative, other 
than a special administrator, who is appointed to succeed a previously appointed 
personal representative. 
(48) "Successors" means persons, other than creditors, who are entitled to 
property of a decedent under the decedent's will or this title. 
(49) "Supervised administration" refers to the proceedings described in Title 75, 
Chapter 3, Part 5, Supervised Administration. 
(50) "Survive," except for purposes of Part 3 of Article VI, Uniform TOD 
Security Registration Act, means that an individual has neither predeceased an 
event, including the death of another individual, nor is considered to have 
predeceased an event under Section 75-2-104 or 75-2-702. The term includes its 
derivatives, such as "survives," "survived," "survivor," and "surviving." 
(51) "Testacy proceeding" means a proceeding to establish a will or determine 
intestacy. 
(52) "Testator" includes an individual of either sex. 
(53) "Tmst" includes a health savings account, as defined in Section 223, 
Internal Revenue Code, any express tmst, private or charitable, with additions 
thereto, wherever and however created. The term also includes a trust created or 
determined by judgment or decree under which the tmst is to be administered in the 
manner of an express tmst. The term excludes other constructive tmsts, and it 
excludes resulting tmsts, conservatorships, personal representatives, tmst accounts 
as defined in Title 75, Chapter 6, Nonprobate Transfers, custodial arrangements 
pursuant to any Uniform Transfers To Minors Act, business tmsts providing for 
certificates to be issued to beneficiaries, common tmst funds, voting tmsts, preneed 
funeral plans under Title 58, Chapter 9, Funeral Services Licensing Act, security 
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arrangements, liquidation trusts, and trusts for the primary purpose of paying debts, 
dividends, interest, salaries, wages, profits, pensions, or employee benefits of any 
kind, and any arrangement under which a person is nominee or escrowee for 
another. 
(54) "Trustee" includes an original, additional, and successor trustee, and 
cotrustee, whether or not appointed or confirmed by the court. 
(55) "Ward" means a person for whom a guardian has been appointed. A "minor 
ward" is a minor for whom a guardian has been appointed solely because of 
minority. 
(56) "Will" includes codicil and any testamentary instrument which merely 
appoints an executor, revokes or revises another will, nominates a guardian, or 
expressly excludes or limits the right of an individual or class to succeed to property 
of the decedent passing by intestate succession. 
UCA §78-2-2(3)(j): 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state law 
certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs 
and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its orders, 
judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to final 
judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(hi) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; 
(v) the state engineer; or 
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources reviewing 
actions of the Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative 
proceedings of agencies under Subsection (3)(e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of the 
-Xll-
United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the 
United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction or charge of a first 
degree felony or capital felony; 
(j) orders Judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of 
Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and 
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees ruling on 
legislative subpoenas. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters 
over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a Court of 
record involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and 
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition for 
writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme 
Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under 
Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63 G, Chapter 
4, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
UCA §78-2a-3(2)(j): 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to 
issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of 
state agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative 
proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax 
Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of 
Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the 
Y111-
Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state 
engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or 
other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons 
who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions 
constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital 
felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the 
decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree 
or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but 
not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-
time, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges 
of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and 
determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate 
jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63 G, 
Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative 
proceedings. 
RULES: 
Rule 7(f)(2) URCP: 
Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial 
memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party shall, 
within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the other parties a 
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proposed order in conformity with the court's decision. Objections to the proposed 
order shall be filed within five days after service. The party preparing the order shall 
file the proposed order upon being served with an objection or upon expiration of 
the time to object. 
Rule 59 URCP: 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all 
or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes; 
provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, 
the court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, 
amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and 
conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment: 
(a)(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any order 
of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having 
a fair trial. 
(a)(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have 
been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any 
question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination by chance or 
as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one of 
the jurors. 
(a)(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded 
against. 
(a)(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, 
which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the 
trial. 
(a)(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the 
influence of passion or prejudice. 
(a)(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it 
is against law. 
(a)(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 10 days 
after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made under 
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Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a 
motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served with the motion. 
The opposing party has 10 days after such service within which to serve opposing 
affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served 
may be extended for an additional period not exceeding 20 days either by the court 
for good cause shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit 
reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court of 
its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it might have 
granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall specify the grounds 
therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the judgment 
shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
Rule 60(b)(4) URCP: 
Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not 
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud 
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other 
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been 
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has 
been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment 
should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from 
the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time 
and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or 
proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not 
affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the 
power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a 
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. 
The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as 
prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
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VII 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the trial court's July 18, 2008 Memorandum Decision 
and Order denying Mr. Henshaw's Motion to Vacate that portion of the trial court's 
May 15, 2006 directed verdict holding that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water 
rights, that the Kings admit they sold to the Watrouses, that Mrs. Watrous thereafter 
sold to Barbara Henshaw, subsequent to Mr. Watrous' death, that Barbara Henshaw 
then sold to Dee Henshaw, did not pass to Dee Henshaw. 
B 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL 
COURT 
On or about July 1992, Barbara Henshaw purchased certain real property, 
located in Wayne County, Utah from Mildred Watrous. In conjunction with the 
purchase of the property, Barbara Henshaw also purchased water rights to irrigate 
the property, which rights had previously been purchased by Mildred and Raymond 
Watrous from Jack and Bonnie King (hereinafter "the Kings"). The water deed 
given to the Watrouses by the Kings specified that the Kings were selling two hours 
of the full flow of Pine Creek every eighteen days. The language of the Water Deed 
was incorporated into the Warranty Deed given Mrs. Henshaw by Mildred Watrous 
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at the closing of the purchase of the property. 
Dee Henshaw completed the purchase of the property from his mother 
Barbara Henshaw and recorded a deed to the property on August 14, 2003. 
However, prior to that time he had an unrecorded deed from Mrs. Henshaw 
conveying the referenced property. 
From the time the Watrouses purchased the water rights, until approximately 
June 1, 2000, both the Watrouses and the Henshaws used the water as needed on a 
daily basis without any objection or complaint from the Kings about how much 
water was being used or how the water was being used. From the time the 
Henshaws purchased the property in 1992, through June 2000, the Kings never shut 
off the Henshaws' water. 
Beginning on or about June 1, 2000, the Kings began interfering with the 
Henshaws' use of their water on a daily basis by shutting off the Henshaws' water. 
Additionally the Kings made calls to the Henshaws threatening to shut off the 
Henshaws' water, dig up their waterline and otherwise prevent the Henshaws' from 
using the water to irrigate their property. 
Sometime shortly after June 28, 2000, without first telling the Henshaws, the 
Kings placed a Vi inch pipe and V2 inch gate valve on the 3-inch waterline. The 3-
inch waterline was installed and paid for by the Watrouses, and it was sold to the 
Henshaws by Mildred Watrous. King installed the Vi inch pipe and the Vi inch gate 
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valve for the express purpose of preventing the Henshaws from being able to use the 
water to operate their hand lines and sprinklers to water their property. From the 
time the Kings installed the lA inch pipe and gate valve on the 3-inch waterline, 
installed and paid for by the Watrouses and sold to the Henshaws, the Henshaws 
were denied access to the water they purchased from Mildred Watrous, who, along 
with her Husband Raymond, purchased the water rights from Jack and Bonnie King. 
On July 14, 2000, Barbara Henshaw, Dee Henshaw and Dana Henshaw 
(hereinafter, "the Henshaws") filed suit against Jack King for: Breach of Contract, 
Tortuous Interference, Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, Theft or 
Conversion, Harassment, and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. King 
filed an answer claiming that he never sold the Watrouses any water rights and a 
counterclaim to quiet title to the water that the Henshaws claim he sold to the 
Watrouses that the Watrouses then sold to them. In his answer, King also claimed 
that Mildred could only sell one half of the water that the Kings sold to her and her 
Husband because the Water Deed given to the Watrouses by the Kings did not 
specify that the water was sold to the Watrouses as joint tenants rather than as 
tenants in common. 
The Henshaws filed an amended complaint adding Bonnie King as a 
defendant on August 23, 2003. The Kings filed an answer to the Henshaws' 
Amended Complaint on September 10, 2003, and on June 7, 2004, the Kings filed 
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an amended answer and counterclaim asserting the same defenses as Jack King did 
in his answer to the plaintiffs' initial Complaint and added a claim for "quiet title." 
Both parties subsequently filed various motions and the case went to trial 
before Judge Lee on April 17, 2006. After the close of the plaintiffs' case, on April 
19, 2005, the Kings moved for a motion for a directed verdict seeking a dismissal of 
Barbara Henshaw and Dana Henshaw as plaintiffs in the case. 
Judge Lee dismissed Barbara Henshaw and Dana Henshaw as plaintiffs in the 
case and he dismissed Mr. Henshaw's claims for intentional interference with 
economic relations, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and conversion or 
theft. Judge Lee also granted the Kings' claim that at most Mr. Henshaw could only 
acquire one-half interest in the water sold to the Watrouses, by the Kings, because 
the Water Deed given the Watrouses by the Kings did not specify that it was a 
conveyance as joint tenants rather than tenants in common and there was no 
evidence that Mrs. Watrous acquired Mr. Watrous interest in the water upon his 
death. 
Judge Lee then permitted the trial to go forward with Mr. Henshaw as the 
sole plaintiff and assert his claims that he had an easement to connect the 3-inch 
waterline to the Kings' 6-inch waterline and to use the 6-inch waterline to water his 
property, and that the Kings did in fact sell water rights to the Watrouses which 
rights were sold to Mrs. Henshaw and then to Mr. Henshaw. At conclusion of the 
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trial, the jury found that Mr. Henshaw was not entitled to use the water the Kings 
had sold to the Watrouses and conveyed to him by the Warranty Deeds from 
Mildred Watrous to Mrs. Henshaw and from Mrs. Henshaw to him because he 
failed to file the required forms with the State of Utah in order to permit him to use 
the water. However, the jury found that the Kings had in fact sold water rights to 
the Watrouses and that those water rights were transferred to Mr. Henshaw by the 
Warranty Deeds from Mildred Watrous to Barbara Henshaw and from Barbara 
Henshaw to him. Therefore, the jury ruled that the Kings were not entitled to have 
the water rights quieted in themselves. 
The Kings prepared an Order on Motions for Directed Verdict and sent a 
copy of the proposed order to Mr. Henshaw's counsel on or about May 4, 2006. 
Mr. Henshaw's counsel objected to the proposed order on motions for directed 
verdict on May 15, 2006. However, that objection was not entered until May 18, 
2006. However, the Kings admit that the Objection was served on them on May 15, 
2006. The Kings' counsel responded to Mr. Henshaw's objection to the proposed 
order on motions for directed verdict on or about May 22, 2006. 
The Court issued a memorandum decision on Mr. Henshaw's objection to the 
proposed order on motions for directed verdict on June 19, 2006. In the Court's 
Memorandum Decision, the Court stated that it had signed and entered the proposed 
order on motions for directed verdict on May 15, 2006. This was the first time 
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either Mr. Henshaw or his counsel learned that the Court had signed and entered the 
proposed order on motions for directed verdict. Neither the Kings nor their counsel 
ever sent Mr. Henshaw or his counsel a "Notice of Judgment" on the proposed 
order on motions for directed verdict as required by Rule 58A(d) URCP. 
Upon learning that the Court had signed and entered the proposed order on 
motions for directed verdict on May 15, 2006, Mr. Henshaw filed a Motion to Alter 
or Amend under Rule 59 URCP, claiming that the Court had improperly signed and 
entered the proposed order on motions for directed verdict because the time for him 
to file an objection to the proposed order on motions for directed verdict had not yet 
expired. This Motion was filed on July 27, 2006. 
On September 13, 2006, the Court denied Mr. Henshaw's Motion to Alter or 
Amend based on its conclusions that the provisions of Rule 7(f)(2) URCP are not 
binding on district courts, and that under the provisions of Rules 59, it could not 
extend the time to file a motion to alter or amend a judgment or order. 
On September 28, 2006, Mr. Henshaw then filed a Motion For Relief Under 
Rule 60(b), asking the Court to set aside the Order on Motions for Directed Verdict, 
claiming that the Kings deliberately failed to notify him that the Order on Motions 
for Directed Verdict had been entered and responded to his Objection to the 
proposed Order on Motions for Directed Verdict in order to prevent him from 
learning that the Order on Motions for Directed Verdict had been entered in time to 
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file an appeal from the Order on Motions for Directed Verdict. 
On November 15, 2006, the Court entered a Memorandum Decision denying 
Mr. Henshaw's Motion for Relief Under Rule 60 (b) holding that Mr. Henshaw was 
not sufficiently diligent in determining if the Order on Motions for Directed Verdict 
had in fact been signed and entered and that the provisions of Rule 7(f)(2) URCP 
are not binding on district courts. 
Mr. Henshaw filed a Notice of Appeal on December 16, 2006, and that 
appeal was assigned case No. 20061175-CA. On November 23, 2007, the Court of 
Appeals entered a memorandum decision stating that it did not have jurisdiction to 
consider Mr. Henshaw's argument that the trial court erred in ruling that Raymond 
Watrous' interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to the Watrouses, did not pass 
to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death and ultimately pass to Mr. Henshaw. 
However, the Court of Appeals did not address or rule on Mr. Henshaw's assertion 
that the Kings did not have standing to assert that Raymond Watrous' interest in the 
water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death or that the trial 
court did not have jurisdiction to rule upon the Kings' assertion that Raymonds' 
interest in the water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death, 
because the Kings lacked standing to even assert that Raymonds' interest in the 
water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death. 
After the Court of Appeals issued its remittitur in case No. 20061175-CA, 
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Mr. Henshaw file a Motion to Vacate that portion of the trial court's directed 
verdict holding that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights did not pass to 
Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death and ultimately pass to Mr. Henshaw. 
On July 18, 2008, the trial court issued a memorandum decision and order 
denying Mr. Henshaw's Motion to Vacate, stating that Mr. Henshaw's Motion to 
Vacate was not timely. However, the trial court, for the third time, refused to 
address Mr. Henshaw's assertion that the Kings do not have standing to assert that 
Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous 
upon Raymond's death and ultimately pass to Mr. Henshaw. The trial court also 
refused to address Mr. Henshaw's assertion that the trial court does not have 
jurisdiction to even consider the Kings assertion that Raymonds' interest in the 
water rights did not pass to Mildred upon Raymond's death and ultimately pass to 
Mr. Henshaw, because the Kings do not have standing to even assert that 
Raymonds' interest in the water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon 
Raymond's death and ultimately pass to Mr. Henshaw. 
Mr. Henshaw then filed his Notice of Appeal from the trial court's denial of 
his Motion to Vacate on August 15, 2008. On September 23, 2008, the Utah 
Supreme Court assigned this case to this Court. 
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c 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about My 1992, Barbara Henshaw purchased certain real property, 
located in Wayne County, Utah from Mildred Watrous. (Record 1-16, 467-481, 
738-755,789-821). 
2. In conjunction with said purchase of real property, Barbara Henshaw also 
purchased water rights to irrigate the referenced property, which rights had 
previously been purchased by Mildred and Raymond Watrous from Jack and 
Bonnie King. (Record 1-16, 467-481, 738-755, 789-821). 
3. The water deed given to the Watrouses by the Kings specified that the 
Kings were selling two hours of the full flow of Pine Creek every eighteen days. 
(Record 1-16,467-481, 738-755, 789-821). 
4. The language of the Water Deed was incorporated into the Warranty 
Deed given Barbara Henshaw by Mildred Watrous at the closing of the purchase of 
the property. (Record 1-16, 467-481, 738-755, 789-821). 
5. Dee Henshaw completed the purchase of the property from his mother 
Barbara Henshaw and recorded a deed to the property on August 14, 2003. 
However, prior to that time he had an unrecorded deed from Barbara Henshaw 
conveying the referenced property. (Record 1-16, 467-481, 738-755, 789-821). 
6. From the time the Watrouses purchased the water rights, until 
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approximately June 1, 2000, both the Watrouses and the Henshaws used the water 
as needed on a daily basis without any objection or complaint from the Kings about 
how much water was being used or how the water was being used. (Record 1-16, 
467-481,738-755,789-821). 
7. From the time the Henshaws purchased the property in 1992, through 
June 2000, the Kings never shut off the Henshaws' water. (Record 1-16, 467-481, 
738-755,789-821). 
8. Beginning on or about June 1, 2000, the Kings began interfering with the 
Henshaws' use of their water on a daily basis by shutting off the Henshaws' water. 
(Record 1-16,467-481, 738-755, 789-821). 
9. Additionally the Kings made calls to the Henshaws threatening to shut off 
the Henshaws' water, dig up their waterline and otherwise prevent the Henshaws 
from using the water to irrigate their property. (Record 1-16, 467-481, 738-755, 
789-821). 
10. Sometime shortly after June 28, 2000, without first telling the Henshaws, 
the Kings placed a XA inch pipe and XA inch gate valve on the 3-inch waterline. The 
3-inch waterline was installed and paid for by the Watrouses, and it was sold to the 
Henshaws by Mildred Watrous. King installed the lA inch pipe and the V2 inch gate 
valve for the express purpose of preventing the Henshaws from being able to use the 
water to operate their hand lines and sprinklers to water their property. (Record 1-
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16,467-481,738-755,789-821). 
11. From the time the Kings installed the lA inch pipe and gate valve on the 
3-inch waterline, installed and paid for by the Watrouses and sold to the Henshaws, 
the Henshaws were denied access to the water they purchased from Mildred 
Watrous, who, along with her Husband Raymond, purchased the water rights from 
Jack and Bonnie King. (Record 1-16, 467-481, 738-755, 789-821). 
12. On July 14,2000, Mrs. Henshaw, Dee Henshaw and Dana Henshaw 
filed suit against Jack King for: Breach of Contract, Tortuous Interference, Breach 
of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, Theft or Conversion, Harassment, and 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. (Record at 1-16). 
13. King filed an answer claiming that he never sold the Watrouses any 
water rights and counterclaim to quiet title to the water that the Henshaws claim he 
sold to the Watrouses that the Watrouses then sold to them. (Record at 24-31). 
14. In his answer, King also claimed that Mildred could only sell one half of 
the water that the Kings sold to her and her Husband because the Water Deed given 
to the Watrouses by the Kings did not specify that the water was sold to the 
Watrouses as joint tenants rather than as tenants in common. (Record at 24-31). 
15. The Plaintiff filed an amended complaint adding Bonnie King as a 
defendant on August 22, 2003. (Record at 467-481). 
16. The Kings filed an answer to the plaintiffs' Amended Complaint on 
September 10, 2003. (Record at 486-494). 
17. On June 7, 2004, the Kings filed an amended answer and counterclaim 
asserting the same defenses as Jack King did in his answer to the plaintiffs' initial 
Complaint and added a claim for "quiet title." (Record at 646-655). 
18. Both parties subsequently filed various motions and the case went to 
trial before Judge Lee on April 17, 2006. (Record at 656-1010). 
19. After the close of the plaintiffs' case, on April 19, 2005, the Kings 
moved for a motion for a directed verdict seeking a dismissal of Barbara Henshaw 
and Dana Henshaw as plaintiffs in the case. (Record at 1068-1071). 
20. Judge Lee dismissed Barbara Henshaw and Dana Henshaw as plaintiffs 
in the case and he dismissed Mr. Henshaw's claims for intentional interference with 
economic relations, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and conversion or 
theft. (Record at 1068-1070). 
21. Judge Lee also granted the Kings' claim that at most Mr. Henshaw could 
only acquire one-half interest in the water sold to the Watrouses, by the Kings, 
because the Water Deed given the Watrouses by the Kings did not specify that it 
was a conveyance as joint tenants rather than tenants in common and there was no 
evidence that Mrs. Watrous acquired Mr. Watrous interest in the water upon his 
death. (Record at 1068-1070). 
22. Judge Lee then permitted the trial to go forward with Mr. Henshaw as 
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the sole plaintiff and assert his claims that he had an easement to connect the 3-inch 
waterline to the Kings' 6-inch waterline and to use the 6-inch waterline to water his 
property, and that the Kings did in fact sell water rights to the Watrouses which 
rights were sold to Mrs. Henshaw and then to Mr. Henshaw. (Record at 1070-
1071). 
23. At conclusion of the trial the jury found that Mr. Henshaw was not 
entitled to use the water the Kings had sold to the Watrouses and conveyed to him 
by the Warranty Deeds from Mildred Watrous to Mrs. Henshaw and from Mrs. 
Henshaw to him. (Record at 1073-1074). 
24. However, the jury found that Kings had in fact sold water rights to the 
Watrouses and that those water rights were transferred to Mr. Henshaw by the 
Warranty Deeds from Mildred Watrous to Mrs. Henshaw and from Mrs. Henshaw 
to him and ruled that the Kings were not entitled to have the water rights quieted in 
themselves. (Record at 1073-1074). 
25. The Kings prepared an Order on Motions for Directed Verdict and sent 
a copy of the proposed order to Mr. Henshaw's counsel on or about May 4, 2006. 
(Record at 1074). 
26. Mr. Henshaw's counsel objected to the proposed order on motions for 
directed verdict on May 15, 2006. However, that objection was not entered until 
May 18, 2006. Nonetheless, the Kings admit that the Objection was served on them 
-13-
on May 15, 2006. (Record at 1079-1081). 
27. The Kings' counsel responded to Mr. Henshaw's objection to the 
proposed order on motions for directed verdict on or about May 22, 2006. (Record 
at 1091-1110). 
28. The Court issued a memorandum decision on Mr. Henshaw's objection 
to the proposed order on motions for directed verdict on June 19, 2006. (Record at 
1125-1128). 
29. In the Court's Memorandum Decision, the Court stated that it had signed 
and entered the proposed order on motions for directed verdict on May 15,2006. 
(Record at 1125-1128). 
30. This was the first time either Mr. Henshaw or his counsel learned that the 
Court had signed and entered the proposed order on motions for directed verdict. 
(Record at 1139-1143). 
31. Neither the Kings nor their counsel ever sent Mr. Henshaw or his counsel 
a "Notice of Judgment" on the proposed order on motions for directed verdict as 
required by Rule 58A(d) URCP. (Record at 1072-1456). 
32. Upon learning that the Court had signed and entered the proposed order 
on motions for directed verdict on May 15, 2006, Mr. Henshaw filed a Motion to 
Alter or Amend under Rule 59 URCP, claiming that the Court had improperly 
signed and entered the proposed order on motions for directed verdict because the 
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time for him to file an objection to the proposed order on motions for directed 
verdict had not yet expired. This Motion was filed on July 27, 2006. (Record at 
1139-1143). 
33. On September 13, 2006, the Court denied Mr. Henshaw's Motion to 
Alter or Amend based on its conclusions that the provisions of Rule 7(f)(2) URCP 
are not binding on district courts, and that under the provisions of Rules 59, it could 
not extend the time to file a motion to alter or amend a judgment or order. (Record 
at 1171-1172). 
34. On September 28, 2006, Mr. Henshaw then filed a Motion For Relief 
Under Rule 60(b), asking the Court to set aside the Order on Motions for Directed 
Verdict, claiming that the Kings deliberately failed to notify him that the Order on 
Motions for Directed Verdict had been entered and responded to his Objection to 
the Proposed Order on Motions for Directed Verdict in order to prevent him from 
learning that the Order on Motions for Directed Verdict had been entered in time to 
file an appeal from the Order on Motions for Directed Verdict. (Record at 1175-
1176). 
35. On November 15, 2006, the Court entered a Memorandum Decision 
denying Mr. Henshaw's Motion for Relief Under Rule 60(b) holding that Mr. 
Henshaw was not sufficiently diligent in determining if the Order on Motions for 
Directed Verdict had in fact been signed and entered and that the provisions of Rule 
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7(f)(2) URCP are not binding on district courts. (Record at 1209-1213). 
36. Mr. Henshaw filed a Notice of Appeal on December 16, 2006, and that 
appeal was assigned case No. 20061175-CA. (Record at 1215-1216). 
37. On November 23, 2007, the Court of Appeals entered a memorandum 
decision stating that it did not have jurisdiction to consider Mr. Henshaw's argument 
that the trial court erred in ruling that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights, 
the Kings sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's 
death and ultimately pass to Mr. Henshaw. However, the Court of Appeals did not 
address or rule on Mr. Henshaw's assertion that the Kings did not have standing to 
even assert that Raymond's interest in the water rights did not pass to Mildred 
Watrous upon Raymond's death or that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to 
even rule upon the Kings assertion that Raymond's interest in the water rights did 
not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death, because the Kings lacked 
standing to even assert that Raymond's interest in the water rights did not pass to 
Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death. (Record at 1248-1258). 
38. After the Court of Appeals issued its remittitur in case No. 20061175-
CA, Mr. Henshaw file a motion to vacate that portion of the trial court's directed 
verdict holding that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights, the Kings admit 
they sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death 
and ultimately pass to Mr. Henshaw. (Record at 1259-1260). 
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39. On July 18, 2008, the trial court issued a memorandum decision and 
order denying Mr. Henshaw's Motion to Vacate, stating that Mr. Henshaw's 
Motion to Vacate was not timely. However, the trial court, for the third time, 
refused to address Mr. Henshaw's assertion that the Kings do not have standing to 
assert that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights did not pass to Mildred 
Watrous upon Raymond's death and ultimately pass to Mr. Henshaw. The trial 
court also refused to address Mr. Henshaw's assertion that the trial court does not 
even have jurisdiction to even consider the Kings assertion that Raymonds' interest 
in the water did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death and ultimately 
pass to Mr. Henshaw, because the Kings do not have standing to even assert that 
Raymonds' interest in the water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon 
Raymond's death and ultimately pass to Mr. Henshaw. (Record at 1391-1393). 
40. Mr. Henshaw filed his Notice of Appeal with the Utah Supreme Court 
from the trial court's denial of his Motion to Vacate on August 15, 2008. (Record 
at 1438). 
41. The Utah Supreme Court transferred the appeal to this Court on 
September 23, 2008. (Record at Volume 6, left side, third page). 
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VIII 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court committed prejudicial and reversible error when it granted the 
Kings' motion for a directed verdict, claiming that only one-half of the water rights 
they sold to the Watrouses passed to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond Watrous' 
death. The trial court also committed prejudicial and reversible error, and abused its 
discretion, when it failed to set aside that portion of its directed verdict holding that 
only one-half of the water rights they sold to the Watrouses passed to Mildred 
Watrous upon Raymond Watrous' death. 
IX 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL AND REVERSIBLE 
ERROR WHEN IT DENIED MR. HENSHAW'S MOTION FOR RELIEF 
PURSUANT TO RULE 60(B)(4) URCP AND WHEN IT DENIED 
MR. HENSHAW'S MOTION TO VACATE THAT PORTION OF THE 
TRIAL COURT'S MAY 15, 2006 DIRECTED VERDICT, HOLDING 
THAT RAYMOND WATROUS' INTEREST IN THE WATER RIGHTS 
THAT THE KINGS ADMIT THEY SOLD TO THE WATROUSES, 
WHICH MRS. WATROUS THEREAFTER SOLD TO BARBARA 
HENSHAW AND BARBARA HENSHAW THEN SOLD TO DEE 
HENSHAW, DID NOT PASS TO DEE HENSHAW, BECAUSE THE 
KINGS LACKED STANDING TO EVEN ASSERT THAT RAYMOND 
WATROUS' INTEREST IN THE WATER RIGHTS DID NOT PASS 
TO MILDRED WATROUS UPON RAYMOND WATROUS'S DEATH 
AND ULTIMATELY TO MR. HENSHAW. 
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POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN DENYING 
MR. HENSHAW'S MOTION TO VACATE THAT PORTION OF THE 
TRIAL COURT'S MAY 15, 2006 DIRECTED VERDICT, HOLDING THAT 
RAYMOND WATROUS' INTEREST IN THE WATER RIGHTS THAT 
THE KINGS ADMIT THEY SOLD TO THE WATROUSES, WHICH 
MRS. WATROUS THEREAFTER SOLD TO BARBARA HENSHAW AND 
BARBARA HENSHAW THEN SOLD TO DEE HENSHAW, DID NOT PASS 
TO DEE HENSHAW, BECAUSE THE KINGS LACKED STANDING TO 
EVEN ASSERT THAT RAYMOND WATROUS' INTEREST IN THE 
WATER RIGHTS DID NOT PASS TO MILDRED WATROUS UPON 
RAYMOND WATROUS'S DEATH AND ULTIMATELY TO MR. 
HENSHAW. 
A. MARSHALING OF FACTS: 
The trial court made no factual findings to support its ruling that Raymond 
Watrous' interest in, or ownership of, the water rights the Kings sold to the 
Watrouses did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond Watrous' death. In his 
Motion to Alter or Amend, Mr. Henshaw specifically asked the trial court to enter 
factual findings so the appeals courts could understand how the trial court 
determined that the Kings had standing to assert that Raymond Watrous' interest in, 
or ownership of, the water rights the Kings sold to the Watrouses did not pass to 
Mildred Watrous upon Raymond Watrous' death. (Record 1137, 1162). However, 
the trial court failed to do so. The trial court also failed to specify how the Kings 
had standing to even assert that Raymond Watrous' interest in, or ownership of, the 
water rights the Kings sold to the Watrouses did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon 
Raymond Watrous' death, when it ruled on Mr. Henshaw's Rule 60(b) Motion. 
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(Record 1209-1214). The trial court also failed to specify how the Kings had 
standing to assert that Raymond Watrous' interest in, or ownership of, the water 
rights the Kings sold to the Watrouses did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon 
Raymond Watrous' death, when it ruled on Mr. Henshaw's Motion to Vacate. 
(Record 1154-1156). Therefore, there are no facts for Mr. Henshaw to martial to 
support the trial court's ruling that Raymond Watrous' interest in, or ownership of, 
the water rights the Kings sold to the Watrouses did not pass to Mildred Watrous 
upon Raymond Watrous'death. (Record 1391-1394). 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN DENYING 
MR. HENSHAW'S MOTION TO VACATE THAT PORTION OF THE 
TRIAL COURT'S MAY 15. 2006 DIRECTED VERDICT. HOLDING 
THAT RAYMOND WATROUS' INTEREST IN THE WATER RIGHTS 
THAT THE KINGS ADMIT THEY SOLD TO THE WATROUSES. 
WHICH MRS. WATROUS THEREAFTER SOLD TO BARBARA 
HENSHAW AND BARBARA HENSHAW THEN SOLD TO DEE 
HENSHAW, DID NOT PASS TO DEE HENSHAW, BECAUSE THE 
KINGS LACKED STANDING TO EVEN ASSERT THAT RAYMOND 
WATROUS' INTEREST IN THE WATER RIGHTS DID NOT PASS TO 
MILDRED WATROUS UPON RAYMOND WATROUS'S DEATH AND 
ULTIMATELY TO MR. HENSHAW. 
1. Standing Is Jurisdictional: 
In Jenkins v. Swan. 675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: "the moving party must have standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the 
court" 
^9 Standing is a jurisdictional requirement that must exist before a court 
may entertain a controversy. See Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, 1)72, 154 
P. 3d 808. Without the jurisdictional requirement of standing, a court has no 
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authority to act. See, e.g., Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air 
Quality Bd, 2006 UT 74, V 7, 148 P. 3d 960 ("Utah standing law 'operates 
as gatekeeper to the courthouse, allowing in only those cases that are fit for 
judicial resolution.'" (quoting Terracor v. Utah Bd. of State Lands & 
Forestry, 716 P.2d 796, 798-99 (Utah 1986))). (Emphasis added). 
2007 P.3d (2007 UT App 154); Gedo v. Rose: 2007 UT App 154. 
2. The Kings Have Not. And Cannot, Establish That They Ever Had 
Standing. To Assert That Raymond Watrous' Interest In The Water Sold To 
Watrouses Did Not Pass To Mildred Watrous At The Time Of Raymonds' 
Death. 
uAnyone bringing an original proceeding—a dispute that is being presented 
to the courts for the first time—must satisfy the traditional standing test" Jenkins 
v. Swan. 675 P.2dat 1148, 1151 (Utah 1983). 
Our generally stated standing rule is that a plaintiff must have suffered 
nsome distinct and palpable injury that gives him [or her] a personal stake 
in the outcome of the legal dispute. "(fn3) Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 
1148 (Utah 1983); accord Utah Restaurant Association v. Davis County 
Board of Health, 709 P. 2d at 1162; Kennecott Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 
702 P.2d 451, 454 (Utah 1985); see Baird v. State, 574 P.2d 713 (Utah 
1978). The need for such a personal stake frequently is described as a 
requirement that the plaintiff s injury be ''particularized." The traditional 
standing requirement is generally justified on grounds that in the absence of 
a requirement that a plaintiff have a "personal stake in the outcome11 or a 
"particularized injury," the courts might permit themselves to be drawn into 
disputes that are not fit for judicial resolution or amount to "generalized 
grievances that are more appropriately directed to the legislative and 
executive branches of the state government. "Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P. 2d at 
1149; see Terracor v. Utah Board of State Lands & Forestry, 716 P. 2d at 
798-99; Baird v. State, 574 P.2d 713, 717 (Utah 1978). (fn4) (Emphasis 
added). 
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Society of Professional Journalists, Utah Chapter v. Vullock: 743 P.2d 1166 (Utah 
1987). 
As a general proposition the right to commence a legal proceeding depends 
on the plaintiffs' suffering an injury to a legally protected right for which the 
law provides a remedy. Absent such a showing, there is no right to complain 
in the courts. (fn2) 
Stromquist v. Cokayne, 646 P.2d 746 (Utah 1982), citing Jenkins v. State. Utah, 
585 P.2d 442 (1978). 
One aspect of general standing doctrine we share with the federal courts is 
the basic requirement that the complainant show f,,some distinct and 
palpable injury that gives him [or her] a personal stake in the outcome of 
the legal dispute.'" 
Provo City Corp. v. WilldeiL 768 P.2d 455 (Utah 1989). 
Utah law requires that the parties to a lawsuit have a sufficient interest in 
the subject matter of the dispute in order to confer standing upon them. See 
Terracor v. Utah Bd. of State Lands & Forestry, 716 P. 2d 796, 798 (Utah 
1986). Either party, or the court on its own motion, may properly raise the 
issue of standing for the first time on appeal Blodgett v. Zions First NafI 
Bank, 752 P.2d 901, 904 (Utah Ct.App. 1988). (Emphasis added). 
Wade v. Burke. 800 P.2d 1106 OJt. App. 1990). 
In Haymond v. Bonneville Billing & Collections 89 P.3d 171 (Utah 2004), 
the Utah Supreme Court again discussed the applicable standards for standing in 
Utah. In Bonneville, the Supreme Court specifically held that: 
As a general rule, a person can sustain a cause of action only where 
he has sustained some injury to his legal personal or property rights, 
the injury and the cause of action being contemporaneous." 1A CJ.S. 
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Actions §32a (1985); Jenkins v. Swan. 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983). 
(Emphasis added). 
A plaintiff who has not been granted standing to sue by statute must either 
show that he has or would suffer a "distinct and palpable injury that gives 
rise to a personal stake in the outcome" of the case or meet one of the two 
exceptions to standing recognized in cases involving "important public 
issues." Wash. County Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, j^ 
17, 82 P. 3d 1125. 
2006 P.3d (2006 UT 36); In the Matter of E.H. |49.; 2006 UT 36. 
In general, standing is available only to a person who has sustained some 
injury to her legal, personal, or property rights. Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 
1145, 1148 (Utah 1983). 
150, id. 
In this case, the Kings have not, and cannot, show that they have standing to 
assert that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water they sold to the Watrouses did 
not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of Raymond's death. 
In order for the Kings to assert that they have standing to claim the Raymond 
Watrous' interest in the water they sold to Watrouses did not passed to Mildred at 
the time the Raymond's death, the Kings would have to show that they are an 
" interested persons," that they are heirs of Raymond Watrous, that they are 
children of Raymond Watrous, that they are devisees of Raymond Watrous, that 
they are creditors of Raymond Watrous, or that they are others having a property 
riglit in or claim against the estate of Raymond Watrous' estate, as defined in UCA 
§75-1-201. 
"Interestedpersons" includes heirs, devisees, children, spouses, creditors, 
beneficiaries, and any others having a property right in or claim against the 
estate of a decedent which may be affected by the proceedings. U.C.A., 
1953, §75-1-201(20) (1978 ed). 
When a statute creates a cause of action and designates those who may sue 
Under it. none except those designated may sue. Berry Properties v. City of 
Commerce City. Colo.App., 667P.2d247(1983). (Emphasis added). 
In Re: Estate of Peterson. 716 P.2d 801 (Utah 1986). 
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The present version of the Utah Probate Code specifies as follows: 
"Interestedperson" includes heirs, devisees, children, spouses, creditors, 
beneficiaries, and any others having a property right in or claim against a 
trust estate or the estate of a decedent, ward, or protected person, it also 
includes persons having priority for appointment as personal representative, 
other fiduciaries representing interested persons, a settlor of a trust, if 
living, or the settlor's legal representative, if any, if the settlor is living but 
incapacitated. The meaning as it relates to particular persons may vary from 
time to time and shall be determined according to the particular purposes 
of and matter involved in, any proceeding. UCA § 75-1-201. 
In the instant matter, it is undisputed that the Kings cannot satisfy the 
requirements of the Utah probate code to show that they are "interested persons" as 
mandated in the Utah Probate Code in order to file a claim against the estate of 
Raymond Watrous. The Kings have not claimed, and cannot claim, that they all are 
liheirs, devisees, children, spouses, creditors, beneficiaries'' of Raymond Watrous, 
or that they are "others having a property right in or claim against a trust estate or 
the estate of1 of Raymond Watrous. Therefore, the Kings cannot, and have not, 
established that they have standing, or would have had standing, to assert that 
Raymond Watrous' interest in the water they sold to the Watrouses did not pass to 
Mildred Watrous at Raymond's death, in any probate proceeding. 
Because, as a matter of law, the Kings do not, and did not, have standing to 
assert that Raymond Watrous5 interest in the water they sold to the Watrouses did 
not pass to Mildred Watrous at Raymond's death, in any probate proceeding, they 
cannot establish that they have any right to assert in a collateral proceeding that 
Raymond Watrous' interest in the water they sold to the Watrouses did not pass to 
Mildred Watrous at Raymond's death. The Kings cannot obtain more legal rights in 
a collateral proceeding than they would have in a direct probate proceeding. 
Therefore, the Kings have no standing to assert in this proceeding that the water 
they sold to the Watrouses did not pass to Mildred Watrous at Raymond's death. 
Because the Kings do not have standing to assert, in this proceeding, that the 
-24-
water they sold to the Watrouses did not pass to Mildred Watrous at Raymond's 
death, this court's Order on Motions for the point in Directed Verdict mling that Mr. 
Henshaw did not acquire any right, title or interest in the water sold by the Kings to 
Watrouses is void as a matter of law, and must be vacated. 
3. Because The Kings Never Had Standing. And Do Not Have Standing. To 
Assert That Raymond Watrous' Interest In The Water Rights Sold To 
Watrouses Did Not Pass To Mildred Watrous At The Time Of Raymond 
Watrouses Death. This Court Never Had Jurisdiction To Hear Or Rule On 
The Kings Claim That Raymond Watrous' Interest In The Water Rights Sold 
To Watrouses Did Not Pass To Mildred Watrous The Time Of Raymond's 
Death. 
As previously established in this Brief, standing is jurisdictional. Jenkins v. 
Swan and Gedo v. Rose, supra. Because the Kings have not established, and 
cannot, establish, that they have standing to assert that Raymond Watrous5 interest 
in the water rights, sold to the Watrous by the Kings, did not pass to Mildred 
Watrouses upon Raymond death, that portion of this court's Order on Motions for 
Directed Verdict ruling that Mr. Henshaw did not acquire any right, title or interest 
in the water sold by the Kings to Watrouses is void as a matter of law, and must be 
vacated. 
Any order entered by a court, without proper jurisdiction, is void as a matter 
of law. "[T]he moving party must have standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the 
court. " Jenkins v. Swan, supra. 
Standing is a jurisdictional requirement that must exist before a court may 
entertain a controversy. See Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20. <\12. 154 P.3d 
808. Without the jurisdictional requirement of standing, a court has no 
authority to act. (Emphasis added). ° 
Gedo v. Rose, supra. 
Because the Kings do not have standing to even assert that Raymond 
Watrous' interest in the water rights the Kings sold to him and Mildred Watrous did 
not pass to Mildred at the time of Raymond's death, the trial court never had 
jurisdiction to even hear or rule on the Kings claim that Raymond's interest in the 
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water rights did not pass to Mildred at the time of Raymond's death. Because the 
trial court never had jurisdiction to hear or rule on the Kings claim that Raymond's 
interest in the water rights did not pass to Mildred at the time of Raymond's death, 
the trial court committed plain, prejudicial and reversible error when it denied Mr. 
Henshaw's Motion to Vacate that portion of the trial court's directed verdict holding 
that Raymonds' interest in the water rights did not pass to Mildred at the time of 
Raymond's death, is void as a matter of law. Therefore, this Court must reverse 
that portion of the trial court's directed verdict holding that Raymonds' interest in 
the water rights did not pass to Mildred at the time of Raymond's death and remand 
this case back to the trial court directing it to vacate the portion of its directed 
verdict holding that Raymonds' interest in the water rights did not pass to Mildred 
at the time of Raymond's death. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED 
PREJUDICIAL AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DENIED MR. 
HENSHAW'S RULE 60b MOTION. 
A. MARSHALING OF FACTS: The trial court made no factual findings in 
denying Mr. Henshaw's Rule 60(b) Motion to Vacate. Therefore, there are no facts 
for Mr. Henshaw to martial to support the trial court's ruling that Raymond 
Watrous' interest in, or ownership of, the water rights the Kings sold to the 
Watrouses did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond Watrous' death. 
(Record 1391-1394). 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED 
PREJUDICIAL AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DENIED MR. 
HENSHAW'S RULE 60B MOTION TO VACATE. 
In its July 8, 2008 Memorandum Decision, the trial court states: 
The plaintiffs' Motion to vacate is based on Rule 60(b)(4) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. The Motion seeks a ruling voiding a portion of the 
directed verdict entered on 15 May 2006 against the plaintiffs. The basis 
advanced in support of this Motion is that the defendants did not have 
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standing to argue that the water nght in this case did no' ^ ; • v *-o I 
Raymond Watrous to his wife, 
A motion under Rule 60(b (4) must be filed within a reasonable time. In this 
case the plaintiffs' current Motion was filed approximately 21 months after 
entry of the directed verdict, after decision on other post-trial motions, and following an appeal The Court concludes the Motion is simp I)> not timeh; 
because it was not filed within a reasonable time. 
There can be no legitimate claim :>ur standing is a i lew issue. Both parties 
agree that the plaintiff argued stcn.i -.g at the time of trial. The plaintiffs 
also raised standing in their Motion to Alter or Amend, filed June 23, z006. 
The issue was raised again in the plaintiffs' appellate brie/filed some time 
in December 2006. However, the plaintiffs waited until 6 February 2008 to 
bring this Motion to Vacate based on lack: of standing. 
The Court finds the plaintiffs' delay in raising this issue is unreasonable. 
Thus the plaintiffs' Motion should be denied as untimely. (Record at 1393). 
The trial vvun^ ruling that Mr lienshaw's Motion to Vacaio was not timely 
prejudicial and reversible error for the trial court, to even assert that there is a time 
limit for vacating a void judgment. 
. iu . _ ,. . ... , ijiiidOic iaci uiai die dial 
court never had jurisdiction ;o hear or rule on the Kings' claim that Ra\mond 
Watrous's interest in the water n nit !!vK;"u> !. a mond .rid M'I -
.ifrmis. die i.x pa^ > d, Ainaiva ajxo Kaymond's death. Lhat lack ot junsdiction 
.*es that portion of the trial court\s directed verdici. holding that the Raymond 
W a r r us N inform • v A, ' - * . ' i. •> ) u - V n •** o - v \\i\-- " 
o- w-^ d \ atrous vi.,; not pass to Mildred upon Raymond's death, void as a matter 
of law, and a void judgment can never become a valid judgment through the passage 
of time. 
In State v. Vaidez. 65 P.3d 1191(Ct. App. 2003), the Utah Court of Appeals 
stated: '"> .;v we it-settledthat subject matter jurisdiction may nc raised at tn * -v. , 
hy eilhtr ^any ur the court. See State v. Rerank, 858 P.2d 927, 95u (Lian iyy^j. "' 
Standing, of course, is an issue that is never waived and can be raised hy 
any party or by the court at any time. See Terracor, ~* 16 P. 2d at 798; 
Stromqulst 646 P. 2d at 747; Wade v. Burke, 800 " 7J 'jot ijnRrn ^ 
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CtApp. 1990); Blodgett v. lions First Nafl Bank 752 P.2d 901, 904 (UtahCt.App.1988). 
In re: Estate of Hunt 842 P.2d 872 (Utah 1992). 
In Garcia v. Garcia. 712 P.2d 288, 291 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court 
declared: 
Either a judgment is void or it is valid. Determining which it is may well 
present a difficult question, but when that question is resolved, the court 
must act accordingly. 
By the same token, there is no time limit on an attack on a judgment as void. 
The one-year [three-month, in Utah] limit applicable to some Rule 60(b) 
motions is expressly inapplicable, and even the requirement that the motion 
be made within a "reasonable time." which seems literally to apply to 
motions under Rule 60(b)(4). cannot be enforced with regard to this class of 
motion. A void judgment cannot acquire validity because of laches on the 
part of the judgment debtor. (Emphasis added). 
Because there is no time limit for filing a challenge to the jurisdiction of a 
court, Mr. Henshaw's Motion to Vacate based on the trial court's lack of 
jurisdiction was timely and proper, and the trail court's assertion that Mr. 
Henshaw's Motion to Vacate was "simply not timely because it was not filed within 
a reasonable time, " is prejudicial and reversible error. 
A lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time and when 
subject matter jurisdiction does not exist, neither the parties nor the court 
can do anything to fill that void. 
Crump v. Crump. 821 P.2d 1172 (Ut. App. 1991), see also. 44 P.3d 724; Housing 
Authority of the City of Salt Lake v. Snyder: 2002 UT 28, 67 P.3d 1055; Fisher v. 
Fisher: 2003 UT App 91 and Curtis v. Curtis. 790 P.2d 717 (Ut. App. 1990). 
Because the trial court based its ruling that Mr. Henshaw's Motion to Vacate, 
under Rule 60(b)(4) URCP, "should be denied as untimely, " for, as the trial court 
incorrectly concluded: "A motion under Rule 60(b(4) must be filed within a 
reasonable time, " without regard for clear and controlling Utah case law holding 
that: 
[Tlhere is no time limit on an attack on a judgment as void. The one-year 
[three-month, in Utah] limit applicable to some Rule 60(b) motions is 
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expressly inapplicable, and even the requirement that the motion be made 
within a "reasonable time," which seems literally to apply to motions under 
Rule 60(b)(4), cannot be enforced with regard to this class of motion. Garcia 
v. Garcia, supra, 
because <s:^\vA'i is ; o^ooriau uedo v Rose, supra, and because alack of 
subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time, Crump v. Crump, supra, the 
trial co'irt committed r^eM'i1:."* s! ..-.•- •. > -P- -•< ?
 ;1. .a \h :;enbt:a*A • 
1: , * icate, unacr Lite provisions of Rule 60(b)(4) URCP, based on its 
incorrect conclusion that "A motion under Rule 60(k)(4] WIST /V cdad w*''- -• i 
he provisions of Rule 60(b)(4) UUCP. Therefore, this Court rnu<f reverse the trial 
court's denial of Mr Henshaw'sMotT —v^> v.vJ *.*y >^  :ase hack 
n . , . . . - . . ;. :,. nensliaw's Motion to Vacate. 
X 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
Becarv ^v i: ** ••• * ; .:\:.,. >o en as-v* thai Raymond -
Vatrous' interest m the water riglits the Kings sold to him and Mildred Watrous did 
ot pass to Mildred at the time of Raymond's death - ] — * • - » ; 
IT • \w: < . * ; ;-.:.:L- ^ijiin ;ia; ^rwiicno interest in the 
/ater rights did not pass to Mildred at the time of Raymond's death. Because the 
ial court never had juris die tior to he , - 'Voo.-* , : .a.. 5 
itei est 111 ilie water nglils did 001 pass to Mudreu at die time of Raymonds death, ' 
ie trial court, committed plain, prejudicial and reversible error when it denied Mr 
!enshaw's Motion to \\u u r p-rj. r *f K - ilnoef oi \ eidict holding 
1a. -\j\;;ii.na's interest in 'lie water rights did act pass to Mildred at the time of 
aymond's death, is void as a matter of law. Therefore, this O- 0 •• - •* e^-
.at portion of the trial in*-::-".- . -:•::. icmg oiai Aaymcnd's interest ai 
e water rights did not pass to Mildred at the time of Raymond's death and remand 
is case back to the trial court directing it to vncnte the portion of its direc~rd 
verdict holding that Raymond's interest in the water rights did not pass to Mildred 
at the time of Raymond's death. 
Because the trial court based its ruling that Mr. Henshaw's Motion to Vacate, 
under Rule 60(b)(4) URCP, ushould be denied as untimely, " because the trial court 
incorrectly concluded: "A motion under Rule 60(b (4) must be filed within a 
reasonable time, " without regard for clear and controlling Utah case law holding 
that: 
[Tlhere is no time limit on an attack on a judgment as void. The one-year 
[three-month, in Utah] limit applicable to some Rule 60(b) motions is 
expressly inapplicable, and even the requirement that the motion be made 
within a "reasonable time," which seems literally to apply to motions under" 
Rule 60(b)(4), cannot be enforced with regard to this class of motion. 
Garcia v. Garcia, supra, because standing is jurisdictional, Gedo v. Rose, supra, 
and because a lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time, Crump v. 
Crump, supra, the trial court committed prejudicial and reversible error when it 
denied Mr. Henshaw's Motion to Vacate, under the provisions of Rule 60(b)(4) 
URCP, based on its incorrect conclusion that "A motion under Rule 60(b)(4) must 
be filed within a reasonable time, " and on its incorrect conclusion that Mr. 
Henshaw's Motion to Vacate was untimely, under the provisions of Rule 60(b)(4) 
URCP. Therefore, this Court must reverse the trial court's denial of Mr. Henshaw's 
Motion to Vacate and remand this case back to the trial court with instructions to 
grant Mr. Henshaw's Motion to Vacate. 
Respectfully submitted this 18th day of May 2009. 
Charles A. Schultz 
Attorney for Dee Henshaw 
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THE ESTATE Of | U'K KIM J 
Defendant. 
I n ! V-. 
! 
MOTION TO VACATE 
! M- | . ( : " 
COMHS Ni j«Vv ucc Henshaw and, pursuant to the provisions of .Rale 60(b) UR.CP rmn^s 
"this Court to vacate rhaf portion ill ( iln itdeot(aiif> i ii<K i mi vlniious lot Directed •• 
Matftntott 
. 2 
Verdict ruling that Mr, Henshaw did not acquire any rights title or interest in the water sold by the 
Kings to Watrouses, on the ground that die portion of the defendants' Order on Motions for 
Directed Verdict mling that Mr. Henshaw did not acquire any right, title or interest in the water 
sold by the Kings to Watrouses is void as a matter of law. 
This Motion is also based on the memorandum filed in support of this Motion and the 
Exhibits attached thereto. 
WHEREFORE, Dee Henshaw moves this Court to vacate that portion all of the 
defendants' Order on Motions for Directed Verdict ruling that Mr. Henshaw did not acquire any 
right, title or interest in the water sold by the Kings to Watrouses 
Respectfully submitted this y /fifty of January 2008, 
Charles A. Schultz 
Attorney for Dee Henshaw 
z. 
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Charles A. Schultz, #4760 
Attorney for Dee Henshaw 
222 West 700 South 
Bngham City, Utah 84302 
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THE ESTATE OF JACK KING, 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTYON TO VACA TE 
Defendant. 
,uug W . L.^«w-
<Y)MI;S N<">\\ !)tv iieiisluiw anil submits Ihe Iolluwmg Memorandum Tn Suri^n ^rhi> 
Motion to Vacate that portion of the ddVtulanfY < }uki 
. vW w • *.I'u w>t i l i i l l i g 
that Mr. Henshaw did not acquire any right, title or interest in the *ater -^'* r- *i< K, mas 111 
in 'uses. 
ffflUt 
ST A TEMENT OF FA CTS 
1. At the close of the Plaintiffs" case, the Court orally granted in part the defendants" 
motion for a directed verdict. 
2. As a part of the Court's grant of a directed verdict in favor of the defendants, the Court 
ruled that Mr, Henshaw did not acquire any right title or interest in the water or water rights 
deeded to Raymond Watrous, and that Raymond Watrous"' interest in the water and/or water 
rights, deeded to the Watrouses by the defendants, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon the 
death of Raymond Watrous. 
3. On or about May 4. 2006. the defendants filed it proposed directed verdict with the 
Court. 
4. On May 15, 2006, Mr. Henshaw filed an objection to the defendants" proposed 
directed verdict 
5. On May 15. 2006. the Court signed and entered the defendants" proposed directed 
verdict 
6. From the first time that the Kings raised their claim that Raymond Watrous" interest in 
the water the Kings sold to the Watrouses did not pass to Mildred upon Raymonds death, 
through the oral arguments and on the Kings motion for directed verdict that Raymond Watrous' 
is interest in the water rights the Kings sold to Watrouses did not pass to Mildred upon 
Raymond"s death, Mr. Henshaw has repeatedly and continual!}' asserted that the Kings do not 
have, and never had, standing to claim that the water nghts the Kings sold to the Watrouses did 
V-u-
not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death, 
• 7 Mi". Hensiiaw specifically argued at the hearing on the Kings' motion for directed 
v^idicnha' Ihr Kin»s did i»"l ha\r slandmg lo ttsseil that kayrnond Watrouses interest in the water 
rights the Kings sold to the Watrouses did not pass to .vlnu- * • 
^ None-the-less. the court granted the Kings motion for directed verdict and ruled that 
• , r - ; r . i •• ••A * :\u wu -, i,.,.:, ; u. UIL water "the water, that '"(lie Kings sold to the Watrouses, did not 
pass to Mildred upon Raymond death itihl w ilhoul i^plammt» h*\\\ Ihr u»int tick mimed (hat the 
Kings had standing to even assert that Raymond Watrouses interest in the water did not pass to 
Mildred upon Raymond s death 
refused to specify how it determined 'that the Kings had standing to assert that Ra) ' n ic nd Watrous' 
interest in the water did not pass to Mildred upon Raymond death. 
In II in- undisputed Unit .HI iiltt linn" ill lh"ii\ mom) W.tfiotis ik'iilli the Kings were not 
heirs, devisees, beneficiaries, or creditors of Mr. Watrous nr of hi'-i estate. 
11,. Tt is undisputed that neither at the time Watrouses death, nor at any time after his 
'sw - ^ a-.-.-v - • s . . w against, either Raymond Watrous or his estate. 
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ARGUMENT 
BECAUSE THE KINGS NEVER HAD STANDING TO ASSERT THAT RAYMOND 
WATROUS' INTEREST IN THE WATER RIGHTS SOLD TO WATROUSES DTD NOT 
PASS TO MILDRED WATROUS AT THE TIME OF RAYMOND WATROUSES 
DEATH, THIS COURT NEVER HAD JURISDICTION TO HEAR OR RULE ON THE 
KINGS CLATM THAT RAYMOND WATROUS INTEREST TN THE WATER RIGHTS 
SOLD TO WATROUSES DTD NOT PASS TO MTLDRED WATROUS AT THE TIME OF 
RAYMOND WATROUSES DEATH, THEREFORE, THAT PORTION OF THE 
DIRECTED VERDICT RULING THAT MR. HENSHAW DID NOT ACQUIRE ANY 
Right, title OR INTEREST TO THE WATER SOLD BY THE KINGS TO THE 
WATROUS TS VOTD AS A MATTER OF LAW, AND THEREFORE MUST BE 
VACATED. 
POTNTT 
STANDING TS JURISDICTIONAL 
Tn Jenkins v. Sweat, 675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court stated: "the 
moving party must have standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court." 
^9 Standing is a jurisdictional requirement that must exist, before a court may entertain a 
controversy. See Jones v. Barlow, 2007 LIT 20, J12, 154 P.SdHOH. Without the 
jurisdictional requirement of standing, a court has no authority to act. See, e.g.. Utah 
Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd, 2006 UT 74, V7, 148 P. 3d 960 ("Utah 
standing law 'operates as gatekeeper to the courthouse, allowing in only those cases that 
are fit for judicial resolution.'" (quoting Terracor v. Utah Bd. of State Lands & Forestry, 
716 P. 2d 796, 798-99 (Utah 1986))). (Emphasis added). 
2007 P.3d (2007 UT App 154); Gedo v. Rose: 2007 UT App 154. 
POINT il 
THE KINGS HAVE NOT, AND CANNOT, ESTABLISH THAT THEY EVER HAD 
STANDING, TO ASSERT THAT RAYMOND WATROUS' INTEREST IN THE WATER 
SOLD TO WATROUSES DID NOT PASS TO MILDRED WATROUS AT THE TIME OF 
RAYMONDS' DEATH. 
"Anyone bringing an original proceeding—a dispute that is being presented to the courts 
6 .,. 
for the first rime—nwsi satisfy the traditional standing test" Jenkins v. Swan, 675 V V» ;tl 1 I4'K 
• ui i v h / . 
Our generally slated standing rule is that a ptumi. l <n: v *iave suffered "some distinct and 
palpable injury thai gives him [or her] a personal stak, ui the outcome of the legal 
dispute. "(fti3) Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d II45, 1148 (Ltah 1983); accord Utah Restaurant 
Association ti Davis County Board of Health, 709 P.2d at 1162; Kennecoii Corp. v. Salt 
Lake County, 702 R2d45l\ 454 (Utah 1985); see Bairdv. State, 574 R2d 713 (Utah 
1978). The need for such a personal stake frequently Is described as a requirement that the 
plaintiffs injury be "particularized." The traditional standing requirement is generally 
justified on grounds thai In the absence of a requirement that a plaintiff have a "personal 
stake in the outcome" or a "particularized injury, " the courts might permit themselves to 
be drawn Into disputes thai are not fit for judicial resolution or amount to "generalized 
grievances that are more appropriately directed to the legislative and executive branches 
of the state government "Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P. 2d at 1149; see Terracor R Utah Board 
of State Lands & Forestry, 7I6R2dat 798-99; Bairdv. State, 574 P,2d 713, 717 (I ltah 
JQ7X) fihA\ ''Fmphasis added). 
Society of 'Professional Journalists, • blah Chapter R Hillock 711 P "><•! Ikiofl \* 
As a general proposition the right to commence a legal proceeding depenas on the 
plaintiffs1 suffering cm injur}} to a legally protected right for which the law provides a 
remedy Absent such a showing, there is no right to complain in the courts, (fn2) 
Stromquist \>\ (j)kavm\ (>K) P 7d n Kill lulu H f ^ t ciiini« IM I «. v H,MI I laii v> • i . a i i l 
( 1 9 7 8 ) . 
One aspect of general standing doctrine we share with the federal courts is the basic • 
requirement that the complainant show '"some distinct and palpable injury that gives him 
for her J a personal slake in (he outcome of the legal dispute/ff 
n
r'M> Ciiy (7;r~ Willden, 768 P.2d 455 (Utah J989), 
• •-• -i/w requires that the parties to a. lawsuit have a sufficient, interest in the subject 
•'•< 'iter of the dispute in order to confer standing upon them. See Terracor v. Utah Bd. of 
State Lands & Forestry, 716 P. 2d 796, 798 (Utah 1986). Either party or the court on Us 
own motion may properly raise the issue of standing for the first time on appeal. Blodgett 
v. Zions First Natl Bank 752 P.2d 901, 904 (Utah CtApp. J988). (Emphasis added). 
Wade v. Burke, 800 P.2d 1106 (Ut App. 1990). 
In Raymond v. Bonneville Billing & Collections 89 P.3d 171 (Utah 2004), the Utah 
Supreme Court again discussed the applicable standards for standing in Utah. In Bonneville, the 
Supreme Court specifically held that: 
As a general rule, a person can sustain a cause of action only where he has 
sustained some injury to his legal personal or property rights, the injury and the 
cause of actum being contemporaneous. " J A C.J.S. Actions § 32a (I985); Jenkins v. 
Swan 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983). (Emphasis added). 
A plaintiff who has not been granted standing to sue by statute must either show that he 
has or would suffer a "distinct and palpable injury that gives rise to a personal stake in the 
outcome" of the case or meet one of the two exceptions to standing recognized in cases 
involving "important public issues. " Wash. County Water Conservancy Dist v. Morgan, 
2003 UT58, 1| 17, 82P.3dU25. 
2006 P.3d (2006 UT 36); In Die Matter of KM. ^|49.; 2006 UT 36. 
In general standing is available only to a person who has sustained some injury to her 
legal personal or property rights. Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P. 2d1145, 1148 (Utah 1983). 
150, id. 
in this case, the Kings have not and cannot show that they have standing to assert that 
Raymond Watrous' interest in the water they sold to the Watrouses did not pass to Mildred 
Watrous at the time of Raymond's death. 
In order for the Kings to assert that they have standing to claim the Raymond Watrous7 
mterest in the water they sold to Watrouses did not passed to Mildred at the time the Raymond's 
death, the Kings would have to show that "interestedpersons " as defined in the Utah Probation 
Code. i.e.. they are heirs of Raymond Watrous. children of Raymond Watrous, devisees of 
? 
Raymond Watrous, creditors of Raymond Watrous, or others ha, inu n nt^nem r^\ < m or claim 
against the estate of Ravmond Wntrnn-:" ^st;in\ 
1
 "Interestedpersons "' includes heirs, devisees, children, spouses, creditors, beneficiaries, 
and any others having a property right in or claim against the estate of a decedent which 
may he affected by the proceedings. 'U.C.A., 1953, § 75-]~20J(20) (1978 ed.). 
When a statute creates a cause of action and designates those who max? sue under it none 
except those designated may? sue. Berry Properties v. City of Commerce City, Colo.App., 
66'7P2d?4'rnQ*u fF.mphasis added), 
In Re: Estate of Peterson. 716 P Jd 801 (Utah 1986). 
i i n . '!«.•>• * : PndiMU I mit specifics «J> iioflows: 
'Interestedperson" includes heirs, devisees, children, spouses, creditors, beneficiaries, 
and any others ha\>ing a property right in or claim against a trust estate or the estate of a 
decedent, ward, or protected person. It also includes persons liaving priority for 
appointment as personal representative, other fiduciaries representing interested persons, 
a settlor of a trust, if living, or the settlor's legal representative, if any, if the settlor is 
living hut incapacitated. The meaning as it relates to particular persons may vary from, 
time to time and shall he determined according to the particular purposes of ana matter 
involved in,. any proceeding. UCA § 75-1 -201 (24). 
Tn the instant -rr\r. •' • • • • • . • v . .
 (J,{,M _ the requirements oi the 
I'tah pi ubitti" code to show mat U\L\ die interested peisoiib " as mandated in the Utah Probate 
Code in order to file a claim against the estate of Raymond Watrous. The Kings mx i m n 
claimed, and ca^r-* ^aim thiil lhr\ ill -IP ,4;- " /.,,,,,.t' . mlaren, spouses, creditors, 
hrth-u^.^r;. • .->; :\dymond Watrous,, or thai rhe\ are """• >WITS hmnng a property right >-r. r , '.ami 
against u try sr estate <*r ?hv '/<ro(> '*"' of Raym^n*! Watrou* rhe'*?forc. *^ K'IW- . . - ' . • ' 
have not. establish*;-* **.v »•,- » . ^ „namii. :\ assen that Raymond 
W aii oils' interest in tl le water they sold to the Watroizses did not pass to Mildred Watrous at 
Raymond's death, in any probate proceeding. 
T
 V a*. -* d not have standing to assert that 
Raymonc A ai;ou> r-ueresi in rhe water thev sold :o rho vv'atrouses iui noi :r&$^ u> \fddred 
Watrous at Raymond's death, in any probate proceeds • * ^*a * 
;
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right to assert in a collateral proceeding that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water they sold to 
the Watrouses did not pass to Mildred Watrous at Raymond's death, in any probate proceeding. 
The Kings cannot obtain more legal rights in a collateral proceeding than they would have in a 
direct probate proceeding. Therefore, the Kings have no standing to assert in this proceeding that 
the water they sold to the Watrouses did not pass to Mildred Watrous ait Raymond's death. 
Because the Kings do not have standing to assert, in this proceeding, that the water they 
sold to the Watrouses did not pass to Mildred Watrous at Raymond's death, this court's Order on 
Motions for the point in Directed Verdict ruling that Mr. Henshaw did not acquire any right, title 
or interest in the water sold by the Kings to Watrouses is void as a matter of law, and must be 
vacated. 
POINT m 
BECAUSE THE KINGS NEVER HAD STANDING, AND TO NOT HAVE STANDING, 
TO ASSERT THAT RAYMOND WATROUS' INTEREST IN THE WATER RIGHTS 
SOLD TO WATROUSES DID NOT PASS TO MTLDRED WATROUS AT THE TIME OF 
RAYMOND WATROUSES DEATH, THIS COURT NEVER HAD JURISDICTION TO 
HEAR OR RULE ON THE KINGS CLAIM THAT RAYMOND WATROUS9 INTEREST 
IN THE WATER RIGHTS SOLD TO WATROUSES DTD NOT PASS TO MTLDRED 
WATROUS AT THE TTME OF RAYMOND'S DEATH. 
As previously established in this memorandum, standing is jurisdictional. Jenkins v. Swan 
and Gedo v. Rose, supra. 
Because the Kings have not established, and cannot, established that they have standing to 
assert that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights, sold to the Watrous by the Kings, did 
not pass to the Watrouses at Raymond death, that portion of this court's Order on Motions for 
Directed Verdict ruling that Mr. Henshaw did not acquire any right, title or interest in the water 
sold by the Kings to Watrouses is void as a matter of law, and must be vacated. 
Any order entered by a court, without proper jurisdiction, is void as a matter of law. 
"the moving party must have standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. " Jenkins v. Swan, 
supra. 
Standing is a jurisdictional requirement that must exist before a court may entertain a 
/0-s-
contwptersy. See Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, Ij'U 154 P. 3d 808. Without the 
jurisdictional requirement of standing, a court has no authority to act (Emphasis added). 
Geda v. Rose, supra 
CONlLL'SiU.'V 
Because the Kings have not, and cannot, < sur- .-. iiat thi s an: interested paj lies, ua 
defined in'the Utah, probate code, they cannot establish that they have standing to assert that 
r
 >wr...^ ;: '•• • -
!:" • h;,::.v .i,
 t... .wiier ngnk. UACV M>JJ to Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred 
uponRajmoaaacatii. iieca"-, J ' •-IKS
 ?:ioceecmig, to assert that 
Raymond Watrous' interest in. the water rights, they sold to the vv atrou - • :> 
> \ J «aiec: upon ici> ;:iona death, tliis court lacked jurisdiction to hear, and rule upon, the Kings 
claim'thatRaymond WHimns' infcresl m llie watt* righrs ihe kings sold to the Watrouses did not 
pass to Mildred up one Raymond death. Because this court failicd jurisdiction to heai .ino i nit. 
upon "the .Kings claim that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights sold to the Watrouses 
did not pass in MiUrul LI|H >n Ka\ luoud death, that portion of this court's Order on Motions for 
Directed Verdict ruling that Mr. Menshaw did not iuitniT i»> rigJn lifle .>• diteieM ui Hie water 
sold by the Kings to Watrouses is void as a matter of law. and must be vacated. 
Dated I M K f i\n\ 
* ';a;:es A. Schultz 
attorney for Dee Hen^w, A r 
/ / 
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Charles A. Schultz, #4760 
Attorney for Dee Henshaw 
222 West 700 South 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Telephone: 435.225.2636 
MAY 2 7 2008 
6TH DISTRICT/ -,OUF. ' 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WAYNE COUNTY 




THE ESTATE OF JACK KING, 
Defendant. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO VACATE 
Civil No. 00600007 
Judge: Lee 
COMES NOW, Dee Henshaw and submits the following Reply Memorandum In Support of his 
Motion to Vacate that portion of the defendants' Order on Motions for Directed Verdict ruling that Mr. 
Henshaw did not acquire any right, title or interest in the water sold by the Kings to Watrouses 
/ ^ 
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT Ot FACJS 
1 The defendants initially asserted, in their memorandum in opposition to \ !• ]^ ••'- -• x>j • 
hi Nr.K':i1 *.•, lli.il Mi Henshawnever asserted during the oral argument on the defendant's motion for a 
directed verdict, that the defendants did and/or do in ! . -.NM ; i\u>mond 
Watrous5s interest in the water rights, the Kings sold to Raymond and Mildred Watrous, did not pass to 
Mildred upon R/-* '•' • • : i - - ,\. -.. \.. ; .cnsiiaw's Motion to Enlarge, the 
•defendants now admit that Mr. Henshaw did. in fact argue, during the oral argument nn flic ilffendnnt's 
ninlion fin a dneciaJ verdict, that the defendants did and/rr dr not have standing to standing to assert that 
Raymond Watrous's interest in the water risjfih l In- Kiir: • * .- \ watrous, did not 
pass to Mildred upon Raymond's death. See the defendants; memorandum in onoosition to enlarge time to 
filerer1, ^""'^anduni page J,, }\ I J ivp, ul nlutli is attached to I his Memorandum as Exhibit 1. 
• 1 ' : his deposition on August 23, 2004, Jack King made the followine, ,idmisMi nis idef i i,ith 
3 Q. Okay, 1 hen you're admitting here today, for 
4 the record, unequivocally, that you sold the Watresses 3 
nours full flow ofPinecreek water? 
o A. Every 18 days, 
7 O. Every 13 days; is that correct? 
8 A. That's right (Page 5 )^ 
24 . -••ajrv. 
u> 25 Are you now .iunninn^ .tien 
1 plaintiffs have the ri<?^f '• *'• • v~'>- ^
 t sek 
2 for irrigation 
3 A. They ~ they have 3 hou10-: Wv<-"*v ,v- /.* -
4 but not ;r;*" u;J> my pipeline. (Pages 1" • I4 i 
14 tou've admitted that the Henshaws have the 
15 v:'fnt to use some water; correct? 
16 ? -'^nt that they had the s*:<zht to use 3 hours 
/3 .. 
17 out of every 18 days. (Page 22) 
19 Q. Are you now admitting that Exhibit No. 1 is in 
20 fact a water deed for the sale of 3 hours ofPinecreek 
21 water to Watresses? 
22 A. Well yeah, they got 3 hours. 
23 Q. Okay. I just want to make it crystal clear 
24 here because this has been the problem from day one of 
25 this. 
1 A. It shouldn't have been because I've already 
2 admitted that a long time ago. 
3 Q. Okay. Then you're admitting here today, for 
4 the record, unequivocally, that you sold the Watresses 3 
5 hours full flow of Pinecreek water? 
6 A. Every 18 days. 
7 Q. Every 18 days; is that correct? 
8 A. That's right 
9 Q. Okay. Great. (Pages 58-59) 
2 A. Well, you — you've already established with 
3 Grace Potter that I deeded them over the three hours. 
4 Q. You deeded them over the three hours? 
5 A. That's right. 
6 Q. Okay. So they own the three hours; is that 
7 correct? 
8 A. I guess they do. 
9 Q. Okay. Excellent. (Page 10) 
25 Q. Are you now admitting, then, that the 
1 plaintiffs have the right to use water from Pinecreek 
2 for irrigation? 
3 A. They ~ they have 3 hours of every 18 days, 
4 but not through my pipeline. 
5 Q. But not through your pipeline, okay. (Pages 13-14) 
13 Q. Let me rephrase it, then. 
14 You've admitted that the Hens haws hcn>e the 
15 right to use some water; correct? 
16 A. I admit that they had the right to use 3 hours 
>H 
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17 out of every 18 days. 
18 Q. Okay, fine. They had the right to use 3 hours 
19 in 18 days. (Page 22) 
20 Q. How many people are you aware of that have 
21 water rights on Pinecreek? 
22 A. Just me and the State Fish and Game. 
23 Q, You're not aware of anyone else? 
24 A. Well, just Dee, got that 3 hours. 
25 Q. All right Okay. (Page 35) 
Copies of the referenced pages from King's deposition are attached to this Memorandum as Exhibit 2. 
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ARGUMENT 
BECAUSE THE KINGS NEVER HAD STANDING TO ASSERT THAT RAYMOND WATROUS' 
INTEREST IN THE WATER RIGHTS SOLD TO WATROUSES DID NOT PASS TO MILDRED 
WATROUS AT THE TIME OF RAYMOND WATROUSES DEATH, THIS COURT NEVER 
HAD JURISDICTION TO HEAR OR RULE ON THAT CLAIM. THEREFORE, THAT 
PORTION OF THE DIRECTED VERDICT RULING THAT MR. HENSHAW DID NOT 
ACQUIRE ANY RIGHT, TITLE OR INTEREST TO THE WATER SOLD BY THE KINGS TO 
THE WATROUS IS VOID AS A MATTER OF LAW, AND THEREFORE MUST BE VACATED. 
POINT I 
MR. HENSHAW'S MOTION TO VACATE FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION IS TIMELY 
The defendants' assertion that Mr. Henshaw's Motion to Vacate is not timely is simply ridiculous, 
and to even assert that there is a time limit for vacating a void judgment is an insult to the court and a 
violation of the defendants' counsel's duty or\f candor and honesty to the court. 
The defendants' assertion that this court was not divested of its jurisdiction to entertain and rule 
upon a Rule 60 motion during the appeal of this matter, is true, but irrelevant, and their assertion that Mr. 
Henshaw is now precluded from filing his Rule 60(b) motion because he did not file it during the pendency 
of his appeal is also a deliberate misrepresentation of the law to the court. No Utah appellate court has 
ever held that a party must file a Rule 60 motion while a case is on appeal or that he will be precluded from 
filing such motion after the case has been remanded to the trial court. 
The defendant's citations to various federal and state cases discussing what is a reasonable time to 
file a Rule 60(b) motion, under the FRCP, are not only irrelevant, they are deliberately misleading. In none 
of the cases cited by the defendants' was there an issue of the basic subject matter jurisdiction of the trial 
court. 
Mr. Henshaw's Motion to Vacate is based on the undeniable fact that this court never had 
jurisdiction to hear or rule on the defendants' claim that Raymond Watrous's interest in the water rights, 
the Kings sold to Raymond and Mildred Watrous, did not pass to Mildred upon Raymond's death. That 
lack of jurisdiction makes that portion of the court's directed verdict, holding that the Raymond Watrous's 
interest in the water rights Jack and Bonnie King sold to Raymond and Mildred Watrous did not pass to 
Mildred upon Raymond's death, void as a matter of law, and a void judgment can never become a valid 
judgment through the passage of time. 
InState v. Valdez, 65 P.3d 1191(Ct. App. 2003), the Utah Court of Appeals stated: "It is well-
settled that subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, by either party or the court. See State v. 
Perank, 858 P.2d927, 930 (Utah 1992). " 
Standing, of course, is an issue that is never waived and can be raised by any party or by the court 
at any time. See Terracor, 716 P. 2d at 798; Stromquist, 646 P. 2d at 747; Wade v. Burke, 800 P. 2d 
1106, 1108 (Utah Ct.App.1990); Blodgett v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 752 P.2d 901, 904 (Utah 
Ct. App J 9 88). 
In re: Estate of Hunt, 842 P.2d 872 (Utah 1992) 
In Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288, 291 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court declared: 
Either a judgment is void or it is valid. Determining which it is may well present a difficult 
question, but when that question is resolved, the court must act accordingly. 
By the same token, there is no time limit on an attack on a judgment as void. The one-year [three-
month, in Utah] limit applicable to some Ride 60(b) motions is expressly inapplicable, and even 
the requirement that the motion be made within a "reasonable time." which seems literally to 
apply to motions under Rule 60(b)(4). cannot be enforced with regard to this class of motion. A 
void judgment cannot acquire validity because of laches on the part of the judgment debtor. 
(Emphasis added). 
Because there is no time limit for filing a challenge to the jurisdiction of a court, Mr. Henshaw's 
Motion to Vacate based on this court's lack of jurisdiction is timely and proper. 
A lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time and when subject matter 
jurisdiction does not exist, neither the parties nor the court can do anything to fill that void. 
Crump v. Crump, 821 P.2d 1172 (Ut. App. 1991), see also. 44 P.3d 724; Housing Authority of the City of 
Salt Lake v. Snyder, 2002 UT 28, 67 P.3d 1055; FISHER v. FISHER; 2003 UT App 91 and Curtis v. 
Curtis, 790 P.2d 717 (Ut. App. 1990). 
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POINT n 
THE DOCTRINE OF "DOCTRINE OF THE CASE" IS NOT APPLICABLE TO MR 
HENSHAW MOTION TO VACATE. 
The Kings assert that Mr. Henshaw's Motion to Vacate that portion of the directed verdict holding 
that Raymond Watrous's interest in the water rights the Kings sold to the Watrouses did not pass to 
Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death is barred by the doctrine of the law of the case. That assertion is 
absolute nonsense. It is spurious, disingenuous and is a breach of King's counsel's duty of candor and 
honesty to the court to even make such a spurious assertion. 
No court has ever ruled that the law of the case doctrine is superior to jurisdiction. Nothing is 
superior to jurisdiction. 
The defendants have not cited, and cannot cite, this court to any case holding that a lack of 
jurisdiction can be over come by the doctrine of the law of the case, and claiming that it can is a deliberate 
misrepresentation of the law to the court. 
We have held that while defects in personal jurisdiction can be waived, subject matter jurisdiction 
goes to the very power of a court to entertain an action. A lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
cannot be stipulated around nor cured by a waiver. A lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be 
raised at any time and when subject matter jurisdiction does not exist, neither the parties nor the 
court can do anything to fill that void. (Emphasis added). 
Crump v. Crump, supra. 
[T]o entertain a dispute, a court must have jurisdiction over both the subject matter of the dispute 
and the individuals involved. If the court lacks either type of jurisdiction, it has no power to 
entertain the suit. See generally 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1350 
(1969). Moreover, while defects in personal jurisdiction can be waived, subject matter jurisdiction 
goes to the very power of a court to entertain an action. Id. A lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
cannot be stipulated around nor cured by a waiver. Id. A lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be 
raised at any time and when subject matter jurisdiction does not exist, neither the parties nor the 
court can do anything to fill that void. Id. (Emphasis added). 
Curtis v. Curtis, supra. 
If the court does not have jurisdiction to act, nothing the court does, any order it issues, any 
/? 
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holding it makes, or any issue it decides is valid, and it does not make any difference how long the 
erroneous order^ holding or the improper decision has been in effect. Without jurisdiction, no order issued 
by a court, no decision issued by a court or no holding of a court is ever valid. 
A void judgment cannot subsequently become a valid judgment "Either a judgment is void or it is 
valid. Determining which it is may well present a difficult question, but when that question is 
resolved, the court must act accordingly." Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P. 2d 288, 291 (Utah 1986) 
(quoting 11 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2862 (1973)). 
(Emphasis added). 
Jenkins v. Weis, 868 P.2d 1374 (UT. App. 1994). "A void judgment cannot acquire validity because of 
laches on the part of the judgment debtor. " Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288, 291 (Utah 1986). 
A divorced modification issued by a juvenile court will never become valid, under the doctrine of 
the law of the case, because a juvenile court does not have jurisdiction to enter a modification of a divorce 
decree. A boundary line determination in a real property dispute, determined by a small claims court, will 
never be valid under the doctrine of the law of the case, because a small claims court does not have 
jurisdiction over real property. A felony conviction, entered by a justice court, will never become a valid 
judgment under the doctrine of the law of the case, because a justice court does not have jurisdiction over 
felonies. A determination of immigration status by a state district court will never be valid, under the 
doctrine of the law of the case, because only the federal courts have jurisdiction over immigration matters. 
Likewise, because the defendants do not now have, and have never had, standing to assert that 
Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights, that the Kings admit they sold to the Watrouses, did not 
pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death, this court lacks jurisdiction to even consider the Kings 
claim that Raymond Watrous's interest in the water, rights that the Kings admit they sold to the Watrouses, 
did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death. Therefore, that portion of the order on the 
defendants' motion for a directed verdict, holding that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights, that 
Kings admit that they sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death is 
void as a matter of law, and can never become a valid order, under the doctrine of the law of the case. The 
/f 
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doctrine of law the case cannot make an order that was entered without jurisdiction a valid and enforceable 
order, no matter how long the order has existed or may exist. 
A void order can never become a valid order, no matter how long it may be in existence. An order 
entered without jurisdiction to enter the order is a void order, and it will never become a valid order no 
matter how long it may be in existence. See, Garcia v. Garcia and Jenkins v. Weis, supra. Therefore. Mr. 
Henshaw's Motion to Vacate must be granted as a matter of law. 
POINT HI 
THE KINGS NEVER HAD STANDING, AND DO NOT HAVE STANDING, TO ASSERT THAT 
RAYMOND WATROUS' INTEREST IN THE WATER RIGHTS SOLD TO WATROUSES DID 
NOT PASS TO MILDRED WATROUS AT THE TIME OF RAYMOND WATROUSES DEATH. 
The defendants make the ridiculous claim that standing only applies to plaintiffs and not defendants. 
It is true that standing does not apply to defendants, if their status in a legal proceeding is only that of a 
defendant. However, if a defendant becomes a counterclaim plaintiff or a cross-claim plaintiff, the same 
requirements for standing applies to the counterclaim defendant and cross-claim defendant as it does to a 
plaintiff Any party, whether an original plaintiff, a counterclaim plaintiff or a cross-claim plaintiff is 
required to prove he has standing to assert a claim. 
As a part of both of their counterclaims, filed in conjunction with their answer, and their amended 
answer, the Kings asserted a claim for quiet title. In those claims for quiet title, the Kings sought to have 
the trial court rule that Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of 
Raymond's death. In pertinent part, both the Kings' counterclaim and amended counterclaim read as 
follows: 
Defendants Jack and Bonnie King counterclaim against Plaintiffs Barbara, Dee and Dana 
Henshaw, as follows: 
6. The Kings are the owners of certain water rights in and to Pine Creek including, but not 
limited to, those rights represented by the Utah Division of Water Rights, Water Right nos, 95-
1629 and 95-5 17. 
7. The Plaintiffs claim an interest in the water rights adverse to the Kings. The Plaintiffs' claim 
Zo 
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is without any right whatever, and the Plaintiffs have no estate, right, title, lien or interest in or to 
the water rights or any part of the water rights. 
8. Since approximately July, 1992, the Plaintiffs have used and continue to use water from Pine 
Creek 
9. The Plaintiffs have no right to use water from Pine Creek, and their use of such water has 
harmed the defendants. 
WHEREFORE, the defendants request the Court: 
L Require that the Plaintiffs, and all persons claiming under them, set forth the nature of their 
claims to the water rights described herein, 
2. Determine all adverse claims to the water rights described herein by decree of the Court 
3. Declare that defendants Jack and Bonnie King, own in fee simple and are entitled to the quiet 
and peaceful possession of the water rights described in this Complaint and that the Plaintiffs and 
all persons claiming under them have no right to or interest in the water rights or any part 
thereof 
4. Permanently enjoin the Plaintiffs, each of them, and all persons claiming under them from 
asserting any adverse claim to the Kings'title to the water rights, and from using any water from 
Pine Creek (Emphasis added). 
Because the Kings asserted counterclaims seeking to quiet title to the water rights they admit they 
sold to the Watrouses, they were required to demonstrate that they had standing to assert those claims, i.e., 
that they had standing to assert that Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at 
the time of Raymond's death. The Kings did not do so, and they cannot do so. Therefore, the Kings 
lacked standing to even ask the trial court to hear or consider their claim that Raymond Watrous5 water 
rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of Raymond's death, and the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction to hear and rule upon the Kings' claim that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water did not 
pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of Raymond's death. 
In Jenkins v. Swan. 675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court stated: "the moving 
party must have standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court"1 Because the defendants asserted 
1. Even assuming, arguendo, that Raymond Watrous' lA interest in the water, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon 
Raymond's death, it did not pass to the Kings, and the Kings have no standing, in this proceeding, to claim that Raymond 
Watrous' Vi interest in the water did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond Watrous' death. Whether Raymond's Vi 
interest in the water passed VA to Mildred and 1/8 to each of his two children, 1/6 to Mildred and 1/6 to each of his two 
children or passed to them in some other percentage, it is irrelevant in this proceeding. Whatever happened to Mr. Watrous' 
Vi of the water, it did not pass to the Kings, and the Kings have no standing to assert possible claims to the ownership of the 
water, or water rights, on the part of Mr. Watrous' children or any other person or entity in this proceeding. Likewise thev 
counterclaims seeking to quiet title to the water rights, they admitted they sold to the Watrouses, the 
defendants had, and have, the duty to prove that they have standing to ask this court to rule that Raymond 
Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of Raymond's death. Because the 
defendants have not done that, and cannot to that, this court does not have jurisdiction to even hear or 
consider the Kings' claim that Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time 
of Raymond's death. Therefore, the directed verdict entered by this court, holding that Raymond Watrous' 
water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of Raymond's death, is void as a matter of law, 
and this court must grant Mr. Henshaw's Motion to Vacate that portion of the Order on Motion for 
Directed Verdict holding that Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time 
of Raymond's death. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the Kings have not, and cannot, establish that they are interested parties, as defined in the 
Utah Probate Code, they cannot establish that they have standing to assert that Raymond Watrous' interest 
in the water rights, the Kings admit they sold to Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred upon Raymond death. 
have no standing to assert a claim that Raymond Watrous' lA interest in the water, did not pass to Mildred Watrous on behalf 
of the public at large. 
The Kings have not, and cannot, show any legal or equitable interest in Raymond's lA interest in the water. The 
Kings have not, and cannot, show that they will be harmed or prejudiced in any way whatsoever if Raymond's lA interest in 
the water, passed to Mildred Watrous rather than to some other person or entity. The Kings have not, and cannot, show any 
significant public interest in the ownership of the water, that would gi\Q them standing to litigate the disposition of 
Raymond's lA interest in the water in the interest of the public at large. 
Because the Kings cannot "show some distinct and palpable injury that gives rise to a personal stake in the outcome 
of the dispute, "Sierra Club v. Dept. Of Environmental Quality. Div. Of Solid & Hazardous Waste. 857 P.2d 982 (Utah, 1993), 
or great public interest that would give them standing to even assert a claim in this proceeding that Raymond Watrous' lA 
interest in the water, or water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death, under clear and indisputable 
Utah law, the Kings do not have standing to litigate the issue of the disposition of Raymond Watrous' lA ownership of the 
water in this action. 
Additionally, because Jack King admitted, under oath, that Mr. Henshaw owns all of the water rights, the Kings 
admit they sold to the Watrouses, the defendants not only cannot show that they have standing to assert that Raymond 
Watrous' interest in the water rights, the Kings admit they sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon 
Raymond's death, the defendants are legally estopped to even assert that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights, the 
Kings admit they sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death. 
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Because, the Kings do not have standing, to assert, in this proceeding, that Raymond Watrous5 interest in 
the water rights, they sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred upon Raymond's death, this court 
lacks jurisdiction to hear, and rule upon, the Kings claim that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water 
rights, the Kings admit they sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred upon Raymond's death. 
Because this court lacked jurisdiction to hear and rule upon the Kings claim that Raymond Watrous' 
interest in the water rights, sold to the Kings sold to the Watrouses, did not pass to Mildred upon 
Raymond death, that portion of this court's Order on Motions for Directed Verdict ruling that Mr. 
Henshaw did not acquire any right, title or interest in the water sold by the Kings to Watrouses is void as a 
matter of law, and must be vacated. 
Dated this 25th day of May 2008. 
Charles A. Schultz 




To alleviate the purported necessity of a transcript and to avoid the attendant delay, 
defendants consent that, for purposes of this motion only, the Court may assume the following: at 
oral argument plaintiff argued that defendants lacked standing to move for a directed verdict. 
With this assumption in mind, defendants supplement their argument in opposition to 
plaintiffs motion to vacate with two additional points. 
First, the law of the case prohibits the Court from revisiting the directed verdict. The Trial 
Court implicitly rejected plaintiffs "standing" argument by exercising jurisdiction and granting 
defendants' motion for directed verdict. If the plaintiff argued "standing" at oral argument on the 
motion for directed verdict, then the Trial Court also expressly rejected plaintiffs argument. 
"Where . . . any . . . final ruling or order of the trial court goes unchallenged by appeal, such 
becomes the law of the case, and is not thereafter subject to later challenge." Tracy v. University 
of Utah Hospital, 619 P.2d 340, 342 (Utah 1980). "In the present action, having failed to perfect 
an appeal from the trial court's [decision]... the applicant is barred from again litigating that 
issue." Id If plaintiff was dissatisfied with the Trial Court's final decision on the standing issue, 
his sole remedy was an appeal and he failed to timely perfect an appeal of the issue. 
Second, a Rule 60(b) motion must be "made within a reasonable time." Utah R. Civ. P. 
60 (b). It was unreasonable for plaintiff to wait until February 2008 to file his motion to vacate if 
he "discovered" the issue of defendants' standing in June 2006 (the date of his motion to alter or 
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2 I A. Well, you -- you've already established with 
3 I Grace Potter that I deeded them over the three hours. 
~Q. You deeded them over the three hours? 
5 I A. That ?s right. 
6 Q. Okay. So they own the three hours; is that 
7 correct? 
8 A. I guess they do. 
9 Q. Okay. Excellent. 
10 Now, the Watresses used the irrigation from 
11 1978 through 1992, when they sold the property to 
12 Henshaws; is that correct? 
13 A. Yeah. 
14 Q. Let's look at Exhibit No. 1 and maybe that 
15 will help refresh your memory. Okay. ITd ask you to 
16 look at Exhibit No. 1, if you would, please. Do you se 
17 the date on that? 
18 A. Up here, March of !78. 
19 Q. Right. 
20 A. That's what it would be. 
21 Q. It's recorded there, and then your signature 
22 is down here lower, and that says 3rd of March 1978, so 
23 that's when you sold them the property -- I'm sorry, 
24 sold them the water rights? 
25 A. I let him use the water before then. 
1 Q. Okay, Didn't -- did not the Henshaws claim in 
2 their suit against you that you had terminated their use 
3 of the water? Wasn't that the basis of the lawsuit, 
4 that you had cut off the water? 
.5- A. I don't know, 
6 Q. Okay. The second paragraph No. 8 on page 7, 
7 take a look at that, if you would, please. 
8 A. (Witness complies.) 
9 Q. Have you had a chance to look at that? 
10 A. Yes, (Inaudible). 
11 Q. Now, that says the plaintiffs have no right to 
12 use water from Pinecreek and their use of such water has 
13 harmed the defendant; is that correct? 
14 A. That's what it says. 
15 Q. Okay. 
16 A. But -- yeah. 
17 Q. Good. 
18 Was it your assertion at the time that this 
19 answer was filed that the plaintiffs had no right to use 
20 the water from Pinecreek? 
21 A. I never asserted that. 
22 Q. You've never asserted that? 
23 A. No. 
24 Q. Okay. 
25 Are you now admitting, then, that the 
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plaintiffs have the right to use water from Pinecreek 
2 for irrigation? 
3 A. They — they have 3 hours of every 18 days, 
4 but not through my pipeline. 
5 Q. But not through your pipeline, okay. 
6 How — what is your basis that they do not 
7 have the right to get the water through your pipeline? 
8 A. They've never done anything on it and they've 
9 never paid me for the right to use my pipeline. 
10 Q. Okay. Now, did not the Watresses pay you for 
11 the right to use your pipeline? 
12 A. No. 
13 Q. Did you not allow the Watresses to use your 
14 pipeline and connect their pipeline to your pipeline for 
15 a period of approximately 24 years? 
16 A. That Ts right. 
17 Q. All right. 
18 Did Alan Bradberry ever tell you that you had 
19 the right to disconnect the Henshaws' water? 
20 A. Yeah. I wouldn't know. I forget what Alan 
21 would say to me. 
22 Q. Okay. Isn't it a fact, Mr. King, that you 
23 told John Hunt, when he was up to your property, that 
24 Alan Bradberry told you that you had the right to cut 
25 off the Henshaws' water? 
1 A. That was the reason for putting it in. 
2 Q. So that they couldn't -- so that they couldn't 
3 irrigate? 
4 A. So that they couldn't steal my water. 
5 Q. Well, if they were using -- if you say --
6 you've already admitted that they were entitled to use 
7 the three hours of water. If you potentially put this 
8 on there so they could not use it, then how are they 
9 stealing your water? Aren't you depriving them of their 
10 right to use the water that you just admitted that they 
11 had? 
12 A. I believe you're turning things around. 
13 Q. Let me rephrase it, then. 
14 You've admitted that the Henshaws have the 
15 right to use some water; correct? 
16 A. I admit that they had the right to use 3 hours 
17 out of every 18 days. 
18 Q. Okay, fine. They had the right to use 3 hours 
19 in 18 days. And you knew that they were running that 
20 water through a three-inch pipeline and that it was 
21 coming off of one-inch risers into their handrails, into 
22 their hand lines, you knew that, didn't you? 
23 A. Well, I guess. 
24 Q. And you deliberately pun a half-inch gate 
25 valve on that three-inch pipe to reduce the water, 
1 plaintiffs have the right to use water from Pinecreek 
2 for irrigation? 
3 A, They -- they have 3 hours of every 18 days, 
4 but not through my pipeline. 
5 Q. But not through your pipeline, okay. 
6 How — what is your basis that they do not 
7 have the right to get the water through your pipeline? 
8 A. They've never done anything on it and they've 
9 never paid me for the right to use my pipeline. 
10 Q. Okay. Now, did not the Watresses pay you for 
11 the right to use your pipeline? 
12 A. No. 
13 Q. Did you not allow the Watresses to use your 
14 pipeline and connect their pipeline to your pipeline for 
15 a period of approximately 24 years? 
16 A. Thatf s right. 
17 Q. All right. 
18 Did Alan Bradberry ever tell you that you had 
19 the right to disconnect the Henshaws' water? 
20 A. Yeah. I wouldn't know. I forget what Alan 
21 would say to me. 
22 Q. Okay. Isn't it a fact, Mr. King, that you 
23 told John Hunt, when he was up to your property, that 
24 Alan Bradberry told you that you had the right to cut 
25 off the Henshaws' water? 
A. That was the reason for putting it in. 
2 1 Q. So that they couldnTt -- so that they couldn't 
3 irrigate? 
4 A. So that they couldn't steal my water. 
5 Q. Wellf if they were using -- if you say — 
6 you've already admitted that they were entitled to use 
7 the three hours of water. If you potentially put this 
8 on there so they could not use it, then how are they 
9 stealing your water? Aren't you depriving them of their 
10 right to use the water that you just admitted that they 
11 had? 
12 A. I believe you're turning things around. 
13 Q. Let me rephrase it, then. 
14 You've admitted that the Henshaws have the 
15 right to use some water; correct? 
16 A. I admit that they had the right to use 3 hours 
17 out of every 18 days. 
18 Q. Okay, fine. They had the right to use 3 hours 
19 in 18 days. And you knew that they were running that 
20 water through a three-inch pipeline and that it was 
21 coming off of one-inch risers into their handrails, into 
22 their hand lines, you knew that, didn't you? 
23 A. Well, I guess. 
24 Q. And you deliberately put a half-inch gate 
25 valve on that three-inch pipe to reduce the water, 
1 have gone back and forth on this, because I guess maybe 
2 I we're just on different pages and didn't quite 
3 | understand. Are you claiming that you own all of the 
4 ] water in Pinecreek? 
A. I never did own that. 
6 I Q. Okay. 
7 A. I (Inaudible). 
8 Q. That's where the confusion was, because I 
9 asked you, "Admit that you do not own the full flow of 
10 the water from Pinecreek," and you denied that. You're 
11 not claiming that you own it, then, all of the water in 
12 Pinecreek? 
13 A. That's right. 
14 Q. Okay. How much do you claim you own? 
15 A. I think it's 14 days out of 18, or maybe more. 
16 I don't know exactly. We've got it down there. 
17 Q. How was the -- how was the water ownership on 
18 Pinecreek computed, do you know? 
19 A. Everybody had so many days water and hours. 
20 Q. How many people are you aware of that have 
21 water rights on Pinecreek? 
22 A. Just me and the State Fish and Game. 
23 Q. You're not aware of anyone else? 
24 A. Well, just Dee, got that 3 hours. 
25 Q. All right. Okay. 
1 Q. Okay. 
2 A. My son is (Inaudible) water meters employee. 
3 Q. Okay. You heard Grace Potter testify earlier 
4 today, didn't you? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. And she testified that she never would have 
7 I notarized Exhibit No. 1 if you didn't sign it in front 
8 I of her; isn't that correct? 
A. That is correct. 
10 I Q. Is it your testimony that Grace Potter was 
11 lying when she made that statement? 
12 A. I wouldn't call Grace a liar, but it's been a 
13 long time. I don't really know for sure which way it 
14 was, but my signature's here and my wife's signature's 
15 there. 
16 Q. Okay. 
17 A. And we admitted that that's our signature. 
18 Why are we dwelling on it? 
19 Q. Are you now admitting that Exhibit No. 1 is in 
20 fact a water deed for the sale of 3 hours of Pmecreek 
21 water to Watresses? 
22 A. Well, yeah, they got 3 hours. 
23 Q. Okay. I just want to make it crystal clear 
24 here because this has been the problem from day one of 
25 this. 
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1 A. It shouldn't have been because I've already 
2 admitted that a long time ago. 
3 Q. Okay. Then you're admitting here today, for 
4 the record, unequivocally, that you sold the Watresses 3 
5 hours full flow of Pinecreek water? 
6 A. Every 18 days. 
7 Q. Every 18 days; is that correct? 
8 A. That's right. 
9 Q. Okay. Great. 
10 MR. SCHULTZ: No further questions. 
11 MR. WILLIAMS: I have a follow-up question. 
12 I!m going to mark this as Exhibit 10. I believe that's 
13 where we are. 
14 (Exhibit No. 10 marked.) 
15 EXAMINATION 
16 BY MR. WILLIAMS: 
17 Q. I d o n ' t h a v e a c o p y o f i t s o I ' m g o i n g t o a s k 
18 you t o t a k e a l o o k a t i t . 
19 A. O k a y . 
20 Q. J a c k — 
2 1 MR. WILLIAMS: And j u s t f o r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
22 p u r p o s e s , I ' m D a v i d W i l l i a m s , I r e p r e s e n t J a c k a n d 
2 3 B o n n i e K i n g . 
24 BY MR. WILLIAMS : 
2 5 Q. J a c k , I ' m s h o w i n g you w h a t ' s b e e n m a r k e d a s 
REGHVPD 
JUL i g 2008 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WAYNE COUNTY 
Wayne County Courthouse, Loa, Utah 84747 
Telephone: (435) 836-1301; Facsimile: (435) 836-2479 
BARBARA HENSHAW, DEE HENSHAW, 
and DANA HENSHAW, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 





Case No. 000600007 
Assigned Judge: Wallace A. Lee 
The following motions are pending in this case: (1) Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate filed on 
6 February 2008; (2) Plaintiffs' Motion to Enlarge Time to File Reply Memorandum filed on 5 
March 2008; (3) Defendants' Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions filed on 20 March 2008; and (4) 
Plaintiffs' Motion to File Overlength Memorandum filed on 27 May 2008. 
All these motions, except for the Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions, have been fully briefed 
and are now ready for a decision. 
DECISION 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate should be denied. Plaintiffs' Motion to Enlarge Time to File 
Reply Memorandum should be granted. Defendants' Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions should not 
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Memorandum Decision and Order 
Page 2 
be considered at this time. Plaintiffs' Motion to File Overlength Memorandum should be 
granted. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Motion to Enlarge Time to File Reply Memorandum and Motion to File Overlength 
Memorandum: 
The plaintiffs requested additional time to file a Reply Memorandum in support of their 
Motion to Vacate. The plaintiffs sought additional time in order to obtain a transcript of the trial. 
However, the plaintiffs filed their Reply Memorandum on 27 May 2008, which was 
approximately three months late. The plaintiffs did not obtain the transcript and did not file it in 
support of their Reply. 
Nevertheless, the Court is willing to consider the plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in 
conjunction with its ruling on the plaintiffs Motion to Vacate. To this extent, the plaintiffs' 
Motion to Enlarge Time to File Reply Memorandum should be granted. 
Similarly, the Court finds the plaintiffs adequately explained their need to file an 
overlength memorandum in reply to the defendant's opposition to the plaintiffs Motion to 
Vacate. Therefore, the plaintiffs' Motion to File Overlength Memorandum should also be 
granted. 
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B. Motion to Vacate: 
The plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate is based on Rule 60(b)(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The Motion seeks a ruling voiding a portion of the directed verdict entered on 15 
May 2006 against the plaintiffs. The basis advanced in support of this motion is that the 
defendants did not have standing to argue that the water right in this case did not pass from 
Raymond Waltrous to his wife. 
A motion under Rule 60(b)(4) must be filed within a reasonable time. In this case, the 
plaintiffs' current Motion was filed approximately 21 months after entry of the directed verdict, 
after decision on other post-trial motions, and following an appeal. The Court concludes the 
Motion is simply not timely because it was not filed within a reasonable time. 
There can be no legitimate claim that standing is a new issue. Both parties agree the 
plaintiffs argued the issue of standing at the time of trial. The plaintiffs also raised standing in 
their Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment filed on 23 June 2006. The issue was again raised in 
the plaintiffs' appellate brief filed sometime in December of 2006. However, the plaintiffs 
waited until 6 February 2008 to bring this Motion to Vacate based on lack of standing. 
The Court finds the plaintiffs' delay in raising this issue unreasonable. Thus, the 
plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate should be denied as untimely. 
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C. Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions: 
The defendants filed a Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions on 20 March 2008. The Certificate 
of Mailing shows this Motion and the supporting memorandum were mailed to the plaintiffs' 
attorney. The plaintiffs did not respond to this Motion, and the defendants filed a Request to 
Submit for decision on 23 May 2008. 
On 27 May 2008, the plaintiffs filed an Objection to Defendants' Request to Submit. In 
the Objection, the plaintiffs stated they had never received the defendants' Motion for Rule 11 
Sanctions. To date, the plaintiffs have still not filed a response to Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions. 
The Court is willing to give the plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt that they did not receive 
the Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions. Thus, it is premature to rule on this Motion. 
The Motion and supporting memorandum are attached to this decision for the plaintiffs' 
reference. The parties are directed to follow the briefing schedule in Rule 7, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Either party may file a new request to submit for decision when the Motion is fully 
briefed. 
j? 
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CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate is denied. Plaintiffs' Motion to Enlarge Time to File Reply 
Memorandum is granted. Defendants' Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions is not considered 
time. Plaintiffs' Motion to File Overlength Memorandum is granted. 
DATED this 18 July ., 2008. 
Wallace A Lee 
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